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We combined a hydro-crop model with a dynamic general equilibrium (DCGE) model to assess the 
impacts of climate variability and change on economic growth and poverty reduction in Zambia. The 
hydro-crop model is first used to estimate the impact of climate variability on crop yields over the past 
three decades and such analysis is done at the crop level for each of Zambia’s five agroecological zones, 
supported by the identification of zonal-level extreme weather events using a drought index analysis. 
Agricultural production is then disaggregated into these five agroelcological zones in the DCGE model. 
Drawing on the hydro-crop model results at crop level across the five zones, a series of simulations are 
designed using the DCGE model to assess the impact of climate variability on economic growth and 
poverty. We find that climate variability costs the country US$4.3 billion over a 10-year period. These 
losses reach as high as US$7.1 billion under Zambia’s worst rainfall scenario. Moreover, most of the 
negative impacts of climate variability occur in the southern and central regions of the country, where 
food insecurity is most vulnerable to climate shocks. Overall, climate variability keeps 300,000 people 
below the national poverty line by 2016.  
A similar method is also used to examine the potential impact of climate change on the economy 
based on projections of a well-known global climate model and two hypothetical scenarios. We find that 
the effects of current patterns of climate variability dominate over those of potential climate change in the 
near future (until 2025). Differences in assumptions regarding rainfall changes influence both the size (to 
a large degree) and direction (to a lesser extent) of the economic impact of climate change. If rainfall 
declines by 15 percent, then climate change enhances the negative effects of climate variability by a 
factor of 1.5 and pushes an additional 30,000 people below the poverty line over a 10-year period. 
Moreover, the effects of climate change and variability compound each other, with the number of poor 













1.  INTRODUCTION 
Zambia is a low-income country with a history of erratic economic growth. Some of this uneven 
economic performance has been driven by unsustainable policies, adverse global conditions, and 
pronounced shocks from macroeconomic reforms (Resnick and Thurlow, forthcoming). While the 
country has performed well since the late 1990s, with positive economic growth and poverty reduction 
(see Figure 1), growth in agriculture remains volatile despite improvements in the policy environment. 
This can, at least in part, be attributed to high rainfall variability (or, more generally, climate variability) 
in the country. Indeed, some of the more substantial declines in economic growth over the past three 
decades have occurred during major drought years.  
Figure 1. Annual total and agricultural GDP growth rates, 1980-2007  
 
Notes: World Bank (2008) for 1980-97 and national accounts for 1998-2007. 
  
Climate variability is manifested at different time scales and in many different ways. Here, we 
focus on annual variations of key climatic indicators, such as rainfall and temperature. Climate variability 
is especially important for the agricultural sector in Zambia, which is heavily dependent on rainfall due to 
the country’s limited irrigation capacity. Climate variability may also undermine attempts to reduce 
poverty, since most of Zambia’s poor population lives in rural areas and depends heavily on agricultural 
incomes. Climate variability therefore poses a significant challenge to maintaining agricultural growth, 
significantly reducing poverty, and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Furthermore, 
there are real concerns over the potentially negative impacts of climate change, which could bring about 
significant long-run effects and potentially amplify climate variability (IPCC, 2007b). Together, climate 
variability and climate change place considerable pressure on Zambia’s government to improve incentives 
for farmers and the private sector to invest in infrastructure and improve productivity. 
Within this context, a number of key policy-related questions emerge: 
  What is the economic cost of climate variability for both agricultural and national 
production? 
  How does climate variability affect household welfare and poverty at the national level? 
  Which regions in the country are most vulnerable to climate variability? 
  Will climate change exacerbate or dampen variability and what are its long-term implications 
for economic growth and poverty reduction in Zambia?  
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This paper addresses such questions through an integrated framework linking together various 
hydrological, crop simulation and economic models that draw on Zambia’s historical data. The next 
section reviews temporal and spatial rainfall patterns in Zambia during the 32 years between 1975 and 
2007 (in the analysis of crop-growing seasons, the data period is referred to as1976-2007 because the 
crop-growing season spans two calendar years). Section 3 estimates the impact of Zambia’s historical 
climatic patterns on crop yields using hydrological and crop yield simulation models. Section 4 combines 
the results from the hydro-crop models and analyzes the impact of climate variability on economic growth 
and poverty reduction over the next 10 years using an economywide model. Section 5 assesses how 
climate variability and its economic impacts may be exacerbated or dampened by climate change over the 





2.  CLIMATIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ZAMBIA 
The high plateau on which Zambia is located ensures that the country has a moderate climate, with 
summer temperatures rarely exceeding 35°C. However, rainfall is unevenly distributed throughout the 
year, with the majority concentrated in the six months from November to April. This leaves the remaining 
months almost dry. Accordingly, Zambia has three seasons: 1) a rainy season in summer from November 
to April; 2) a cool dry winter season from May to August; and 3) a hot dry season in September and 
October. Hence, for most rain-fed crops, the growing season is the rainy season. Moreover, much of the 
country’s socioeconomic life is dominated by the onset and cessation of the rainy season, and the amount 
of rain it brings.  
The agro-climatic characteristics in any country or subnational region are primarily determined 
by intra-year distributions and inter-year variations in rainfall and temperature. The rains of Zambia are 
brought by the Intertropical Convergence Zone, which is located north of the country in the dry season; it 
moves southwards in the second half of the year, and returns northwards in the first half of the year. 
Given Zambia’s altitude, its temperatures are lower than those of coastal regions at similar latitudes. A 
detailed analysis of the causes of Zambia’s climate and agriculturally important weather events are 
beyond the scope of this report.  
For this study, monthly weather observations were made available by the Zambia Meteorological 
Department; we use data obtained at 30 weather stations for the period 1976-2007 (see the red markers in 
Figure 2).
1 These 30 meteorological stations are located in five distinguished agroecological zones that 
later form the spatial unit for our analysis. 
Figure 2. Zambia’s agroecological zones, meteorological stations and Thiessen polygons  
 
Notes: Thiessen Polygons were created to define the influencing domain of each of the 30 meteorological stations. 
Red triangles mark the locations of the meteorological stations. 
Spatial Distributions of Annual Rainfall and Evaporation 
Figure 3 shows the average annual rainfall at the 30 weather stations in Zambia during 1976-2007 
interpolated to 1 km pixels. We see a downward gradient of annual rainfall from the north to the south of 
the country, with the highest rainfall in the northwest and northeast (generally above 1200 mm) and the 
lowest in the southwest (generally below 800 mm).  
                                                       
1 There is a tradeoff between station coverage and the lengths of observations available from the selected stations. The 
choice of data from 30 stations for the period 1975-2007 was thus a balance between cross-sectional and time-series coverage.  
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‘Reference evapotranspiration’ (ETO) is the evapotranspiration potential (or atmospheric water 
demand) of a reference grass. It is a hypothetical reference crop with an assumed crop height of 0.12 m, a 
fixed surface resistance of 70 s m
-1, and an albedo of 0.23 (Allen et al. 1998). This measure provides the 
basis for estimating crop water requirements, which is essential information when seeking to estimate 
how changes in rainfall or water availability affect crop yields. We calculate monthly ETO using weather 
data from the 30 stations, and then interpolate the mean annual ETO values to 1 km pixels, as shown in 
Figure 4. The results indicate that, in contrast to the declining trend of rainfall, ETO increases from the 
north to the south, especially in the southwest part of the country. This suggests that rainfall is lowest in 
areas where the crop water requirements are highest, thus exposing rain-fed agriculture in the south to 
considerable risks of yield losses or even crop failure during droughts.  
Figure 3. Average annual rainfall, 1975-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department. 
Notes: Generated from 1 km pixel-averaged annual rainfall interpolated from 30 weather stations. 
Figure 4. Average annual reference evapotranspiration, 1975-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department.  
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Notes: Generated from 1 km-pixel averaged annual ETo interpolated from ETo values calculated for 30 weather 
stations. 
The main objective of this study is to analyze the impact of climate variability on Zambia’s 
economy, which relies heavily on agriculture. While detailed spatial information at a more disaggregated 
level is available for some of the climate-related indicators, and this level of discrimination might be more 
helpful for an analysis of climate variability, the related social and economic data are not currently 
available at this level.  
To capture certain spatial patterns of climate variability and agricultural production, we first 
aggregate the country into five agroecological zones. There are four nationally defined agroecological 
zones, Zone I, Zone IIa, Zone IIb, and Zone III, and we further divide Zone IIa into two subzones, Zone 
IIa1 and Zone IIa2, because of differences in their rainfall patterns (see below for discussion). Zone I 
covers most of the Southern province and parts of Lusaka and the Eastern provinces. Zone IIa1 covers the 
capital city Lusaka and the eastern parts of the Central province, while Zone IIa2 includes the western 
parts of the Central province and most of the Eastern province. Zone IIb comprises most of the Western 
province. Finally, Zone III, which is the largest in terms of geographic size, includes the Copperbelt, 
North Western, Luapula and Northern provinces. In this study, rainfall and other meteorological data are 
aggregated to these five zones, taking into consideration the influencing domain of each weather station 
(Figure 2). Zonal-level average annual rainfall is presented in Figure 5, which shows a similar pattern to 
that found in Figure 3, with the highest rainfall in the northern Zone III, and the lowest rainfall in the 
southern Zone I. Zone IIa1 has a mean annual rainfall of 818 mm, which is only slightly higher than that 
of Zone I. In contrast, Zones IIa2 and IIb have higher annual rainfalls, at 941 mm and 930 mm, 
respectively. These differences emphasize the importance of separating the eastern and western parts of 
Zone IIa, especially since most of Zambia’s economic activity takes place near Lusaka.
2  
Figure 5. Average annual precipitation by agroecological zone, 1976-2007 (mm) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department. 
Intra-annual distribution and Inter-Annual Variations of Rainfall and Evaporation 
The distribution of rainfall and temperatures during a year determines the growing season of annual crops 
and influences yields, especially those of crops cultivated under rain-fed conditions. Figure 6 shows 
monthly rainfall distributions in Zambia’s five agroecological zones. In all five zones, most of the rainfall 
                                                       
2 Appendix C describes the economic structure of the five agroecological zones.  
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is concentrated between November and April (the rainy season), with virtually no rainfall from May to 
September (the dry winter season). Although the 20- to 40-mm rainfall seen in October marks the end of 
the dry season, the depletion of soil moisture during the dry season may prevent immediate crop planting 
in this month. While all five zones experience similar rainfall patterns across the seasons, certain within-
season differences can be found among the zones. For instance, the January-March rainfall in Zone III is 
nearly 300 mm higher than that in Zone I. This becomes particularly important when we note that 300 
mm of water is close to 50 percent of the water required by some dry land crops. 
Figure 6. Mean monthly precipitation by agroecological zone, 1976-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department. 
 
Compared to the intra-year distribution of rainfall, the ETO shown in Figure 7 is low during the 
rainy months and high during the dry months. For all zones, the lowest ETO is seen in December to 
February (around 100 mm), when the wind speed is lowest and rainfall and relative humidity are highest 
for the year. The highest ETO values are seen in September, when these values range from a low of about 
160 mm in Zone III to a high of 200 mm in Zone IIb. During this month, the temperature and wind speed 
are highest and the relative humidity is lowest for the year. Interestingly, a second peak of ETO is seen in 
May in all zones; this is confirmed by the observed open-water pan evaporation data for most of the 30 
weather stations. For Zone III, the relative humidity is lower and the wind speed is higher during May 
compared to those values in April and June, perhaps explaining the small peak of ETO in May. This is not 
seen in other zones.
3   
Year-to-year variations in rainfall are generally high in zones with low rainfall and low in wetter 
zones towards the north. Figure 8 gives the normalized standard deviation (i.e., the coefficient of 
variation) of annual rainfall for the period 1976-2007. The dry Zones I and IIa1 have the highest inter-
annual rainfall variabilities, with coefficients of 0.180 and 0.203, respectively. Assuming that the annual 
rainfall amount follows a normal distribution, this implies that in Zone IIa1, for example, there is about a 
30 percent probability that the rainfall in any given year will be 20 percent (i.e., 170 mm) higher or lower 
than the mean rainfall level of 820 mm shown in Figure 5. This indicates the potential for moderate 
drought or flood events, depending on the distribution of the rainfall deficit or surplus in a particular rainy 
season. A higher coefficient of variation for Zone IIa1 indicates that this zone has a higher inter-annual 
rainfall variation compared to that in Zone I, despite the latter having a lower average annual rainfall.  
                                                       
3 A thorough explanation of the bimodal intra-year distribution of ETO must await further analysis.  
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Figure 7. Mean monthly reference evapotranspiration in the agroecological zones, 1976-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department. 
Figure 8. Annual precipitation coefficient of variation by agroecological zone, 1976-2007  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department. 
Notes: Standard deviation is used to indicate inter-annual variations of rainfall in an agroecological zone. 
 
Figure 9 shows inter-year rainfall variations in each of the five zones, while Figure 10 shows the 
percent deviations of annual rainfall from their means. The annual dry and wet fluctuations appear to 
share the same rhythms during major drought and wet years in Zones I, IIa1, IIa2 and IIb, but not in Zone 
III. This indicates that drought events can be nationwide in some years, making the country less capable 
of mitigating drought consequences through its own efforts. The wet Zone III shows only moderate inter-
year rainfall variation, with rainfall in most years lying within 10 percent of the mean and rarely falling 
below 1100 mm. In contrast, the rainfall deviations in Zones I, IIa1 and IIb frequently exceed 20 percent 
of the mean, and approach 30 percent deficits in major drought years.  
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Figure 9. Annual precipitation in the agroecological zones, 1976-2007 
 
Zones I, IIa1 and IIb 
 
 
Zones IIa2 and III 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department. 
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Figure 10. Annual deviation from long-term mean precipitation for the agroecological zones  
 
Zones I, IIa1 and IIb 
 
 
Zones IIa2 and III 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using historical rainfall data from the Zambia Meteorological Department. 
 
The potential evapotranspiration (ET) values for maize during its growing season are shown in 
Figure 11.
4 Maize is chosen for the discussion because it is Zambia’s most important annual crop. Clearly 
the amplitudes of the inter-year potential ET variations are much smaller than the rainfall amounts. 
Nevertheless, as is seen for rainfall, the variations of potential ET are large in Zones I, IIa1 and IIb but 
small in Zones IIa2 and III. Even for zones with large variations, the difference in maize 
evapotranspiration between any two years is well within 100 mm (Zone III, it is only around 30 mm). The 
potential ET for maize during the growing season in each of the zones is found to be inversely correlated 
with zonal rainfall. The opposite deviations of rainfall and potential ET in the same year are particularly 
                                                       
4 See Appendix A.  
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apparent in major drought years (1986/87, 1991/92, 1994/5 and 2004/05) and major wet years (1977/78, 
1988/89, 1992/93 and 2006/07).
5 This suggests that larger-than-usual amounts of water are needed by 
crops during years when rainfall is low. On the other hand, crop water requirements are usually below 
normal in years when rainfall is high (potentially due to flooding and water-logging). 
Figure 11. Growing period potential evapotranspiration of maize in the agroecological zones, 1976-
2007 
 
Zones I, IIa1 and IIb 
 
 
Zones IIa2 and III 
 
Source: Results from the hydro-crop model (see below). 
                                                       
5 The harvest year is usually associated with drought/floods, even though the growing season spans two calendar years. For 
example, the drought that took place during the 1991-92 season corresponds to 1992 for the other data sources (e.g., national 
accounts). We follow this convention when the season is not explicitly identified in the text.   
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Distribution of Droughts and Wet Events Based on Drought Index Analysis 
As droughts are complex phenomena, their severity is often measured using an index. For agriculture, 
drought indices usually take into account the amount of soil water available to crops, rather than focusing 
solely on rainfall deficits. For this study we use the Palmer Z index (Palmer 1965; Alley 1984), a drought 
severity metric that out-performs other indicators of monthly soil moisture conditions. The Palmer Z 
index, which is based on the supply-demand concept of the soil water balance, not only accounts for more 
than just rainfall deficits at specific locations, it also provides a standardized measure of moisture 
conditions, thus allowing for comparisons across locations and time periods. Detailed calculation 
procedures can be found in Palmer (1965).  
The annual drought indices discussed below are actually a wet season (November-March) 
average of the monthly Palmer Z indices, largely because the wet season overlaps with the growing 
period of most rain-fed crops, including maize. A negative value for the Palmer Z index indicates dry 
conditions, while a positive value indicates wet conditions. Unfortunately, the monthly meteorological 
data we use in this study do not provide sufficient information to enable us to identify floods (which 
usually occur over much shorter periods of time, such as a few days) versus heavy rains (World Bank, 
2008). However, the wet conditions indicated by a high positive value of the Palmer Z index might 
suggest the presence of flooding. Monthly Palmer Z indices are calculated for 1975-2007 for the five 
agroecological zones, and are then averaged over the wet season to create annual drought indices for each 
zone for the 1976-2007 harvest years. As shown in Table1, threshold values are chosen for the index, 
allowing us to categorize the growing seasons into severe drought years (-1.5), moderate drought years (-
0.5), normal years, moderately wet years (0.5) and very wet years (1.5). The threshold values are more or 
less arbitrarily set as described in Palmer (1965). It is worth noting that the original ‘near normal’ range 
given by Palmer (1965) was -0.49 to 0.49.  
Table 1. Number of years of simultaneous climatic event occurrences across agroecological zones, 
1976-2007 






a ≤ -1.5) 
Moderate 
drought 
(-1.5 < Z ≤ -0.5) 
Normal 
 
(-0.5 < Z ≤ 0.5) 
Moderately 
wet 
(0.5 < Z ≤ 1.5) 
Very wet 
 
(Z > 1.5 ) 
5 0  1  (1994)  0  0  0 
4 0  4  0  4  1 




(1992: I, IIa1, IIb) 





(1995: I, IIa1; 
2005: I, IIa1) 
4 11  2 
 
1 











(1979: III; 1989: IIa1; 
1997: IIa1; 2004: 2b) 
Note a: Values represent the averaged monthly Palmer Z Indices for the maize-growing periods from November to 
March. The monthly Palmer Z index shows how monthly moisture conditions depart from normal, reflecting short-
term drought and wetness (Palmer 1965; Alley 1984). 
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From the perspective of agriculture, a drought’s spatial extent can prove as important as its 
severity measure. The simultaneous occurrence of drought conditions across large areas can greatly 
reduce a country’s ability to mitigate negative outcomes and provide food assistance to drought-stricken 
regions. Table 1, which gives the frequencies of drought/wet events taking place simultaneously across 
agroecological zones during the 1976-2007 study period, shows that the worst drought events are seen 
during the 1991/92 growing season, when three out of the five zones experienced severe droughts (i.e., 
Zones I, IIa1, IIb). Zones I and IIa1 also experienced severe droughts during the 1994/95 and 2004/05 
seasons, while Zone IIa1 alone experienced a severe drought in 1986/87. These four periods represent the 
major drought years in the historical rainfall data. 
In Zambia, we see that moderate droughts occur more often than severe droughts and usually 
affect larger areas. Table 1 shows that all five agroecological zones experienced moderate droughts 
during the 1993/94 season; this is the only countrywide moderate drought observed in the 32-year period 
between 1976 and 2007. In addition, there were four other rainy seasons during the study period when 
four of the five zones were simultaneously affected by moderate droughts; four seasons when three of the 
five zones were simultaneously affected; and four seasons when two of the five zones were 
simultaneously affected. It is more common for only one agroecological zone to be under moderate 
drought conditions; there were seven seasons with moderate droughts in one of the five zones, with a 
reoccurrence interval of approximately 4.5 years. 
‘Normal’ weather (i.e., a Palmer Z index between -0.5 and 0.5) was never simultaneously 
observed in more than three of the five agroecological zones during the 32-year study period, indicating 
that Zambia is prone to extreme weather events. There were six seasons when normal weather 
simultaneously occurred in three of the five zones; eleven seasons when normal weather was seen 
simultaneously in two zones; and ten seasons when normal weather was seen in only one zone. 
Moderately wet and very wet events appear to be less frequent than droughts, and were never 
experienced by all five zones simultaneously. The indices show four seasons during which moderately 
wet conditions occurred simultaneously in four of the five zones; five seasons when moderate wet 
occurred simultaneously in three zones, and two seasons when moderate wet occurred simultaneously in 
two zones. The chance that only one zone would be moderately wet during a given season was 
considerably higher (i.e., nine out of a total of 32 years). 
Finally, as with severe droughts, very wet conditions rarely occur simultaneously in Zambia. The 
1977/78 season was the only period during which four zones (Zones I, IIa1, IIa2 and IIb) simultaneously 
experienced very wet conditions. Moreover, the 1980/81 season was the only period during which two 
zones (Zones I and IIb) were simultaneously affected, while only four seasons could be characterized as 
having a single agroecological zone under very wet conditions. 
Some conclusions can be drawn from Table 1. First, Zambia is prone to droughts and floods; 
there is a high chance that at least one agroecological zone experienced an abnormal weather event in any 
given year. Second, the central and southern regions of the country (Zones I, IIa1 and IIb) are particularly 
prone to both droughts and floods, whereas Zone III shows fairly stable weather conditions, with no 
severe droughts over the last three decades and only one season (i.e. 1978/79) identified as being very 
wet. Third, it seems that drought events have grown more frequent over time, with almost all of the 




3. MODELING THE BIOPHYSICAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY  
USING A HYDRO-CROP MODEL  
Two types of models are used to analyze the economic impacts of variability and climate change herein: 
an integrated hydro-crop model is first used to predict soil water balances and crop yield responses in 
Zambia’s five agroecological zones, and then this information is applied to an economywide dynamic 
computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model, which estimates impacts on production at the subsector, 
zonal and national levels, as well as on household incomes and poverty. This section describes the hydro-
crop model and the estimation of crop yield losses resulting from climate variability.  
Quantitative data on the responses of crop yields to water deficiency are crucial for evaluating the 
economic impacts of climate variability and change on agricultural production. In Zambia, the impact of 
climate variability on agriculture is especially important, given that it is the primary impact channel 
through which the broader economy is affected (World Bank, 2008). Different approaches may be used to 
estimate crop yields under varying weather conditions. One approach is to use process-oriented crop 
growth models to simulate crop growth and yields, taking into account detailed biophysical processes 
ranging from the extraction of water and nutrients by root systems, to plant photosynthesis and yield 
formation. However, these kinds of models require extensive soil and crop information, and are typically 
constructed separately for different crops. Given the lack of data for Zambia, we herein adopt a semi-
empirical approach and develop a hydro-crop model that includes two stages. In the first stage, we 
simulate actual evapotranspiration using a soil water balance model for crop root zones; this is similar to 
the procedure recommended in Allen et al. (1998). In the second stage, we estimate crop yield responses 
to water deficits using the empirical crop water production model originally proposed by Jensen (1968). 
Together, these two stages form our integrated ‘hydro-crop’ model.  
The output of the hydro-crop model becomes an input into the economywide DCGE model that 
we use to assess the economic impact of climate variability. The DCGE model contains information on 
different sectors, factors and households in each of the five agroecological zones. For example, the model 
distinguishes among 34 different sectors, half of which are crop and livestock subsectors and the other 
half are industrial and service subsectors. Production in each agricultural subsector is disaggregated 
across zones using district-level data provided by the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries. We 
also separate small/large-scale and rural/urban agricultural production. In this way, the model captures 
differences in cropping and livestock patterns driven by agroecological conditions and farm land 
endowments. This disaggregation of production allows the DCGE model to capture how climate 
conditions vary across zones, and how climate affects crops differently according to their agronomic 
characteristics. The economywide model’s characteristics and simulations are described in detail in 
Section 4.  
The Hydro-Crop Model 
The soil water balance module of the hydro-crop model regards the crop’s root zone as a bucket, with 
water flowing in through rainfall (and irrigation if applicable), and leaking away as evapotranspiration, 
runoff and deep percolation. The first step in calculating the soil water balance is to estimate crop’s water 
requirements, which are normally expressed by the rate of potential ET. The United Nation’s Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) has developed a practical procedure for estimating a crop’s water 
requirements (Allen et al. 1998), which has become a widely accepted standard. Owing to the difficulty of 
obtaining readily available and accurate field measurements, estimates of crop water requirements are 
typically derived from estimates of crop ET for a reference crop (similar to clipped grass) under the 
relevant climatic conditions. The water requirements of a given crop are thereafter derived through a 
calculation that integrates the combined effects of crop transpiration and soil evaporation into a single 
crop coefficient. Details of the soil water balance model and the crop water production model are given in 
Appendices A and B.   
14 
 
There is a rich literature on crop yield responses to water deficits (e.g. Jensen 1968; Doorenbos 
and Kassam 1979). However, the decision on which crop water production model to use for an economic 
evaluation is usually constrained by the complex nature of these models and the availability of the 
necessary parameters. Thus, simpler estimation models, such as the FAO linear yield response model 
(Doorenbos and Kassam 1979) and Jensen’s model (Jensen 1968), are usually preferred over more 
complex models.  
The FAO model is a practical approach for measuring crop yield responses to water supplies: it is 
relatively simple; requires commonly available climatic, water, soil and crop data; and is applied widely 
with acceptable levels of accuracy.
6 However, the FAO linear model for the total growing period does not 
work well for Zambia; a comparison of observed yields versus FAO model simulations suggests that crop 
losses in the country are especially sensitive to seasonal water deficits. Therefore, it is not appropriate to 
apply this model, which uses relative evapotranspiration for the entire growing season and thus cannot 
capture monthly climate variations and crop yield sensitivities, which are critical in Zambia. Yield 
response factors for individual growing periods are available from the FAO (1979), and may be used to 
assess yield losses due to water deficits in an individual crop-growing period. However, there is no detail 
discussion in the method in the FAO study for how to use these factors conjunctively to assess yield loss 
due to water deficits in multiple growing periods. Therefore, we use the Jensen crop water production 
model
7 and estimate the necessary crop water sensitivity index values based on FAO yield response 
factors for individual growing periods throughout the growing season (FAO 1979). These estimates are 
then mapped to each month of the relevant crops’ growing periods using the cumulative sensitivity index 
method (Tsakiris 1982; Kipkorir, 2002). Figure 12 shows the monthly crop water sensitivity indices for 
maize, sorghum and root crops. 
Figure 12. The crop water sensitivity index from the Jensen crop water production functions for 
maize, sorghum and root crops. The vertical axis is the crop water sensitivity index, which is 
dimensionless. 
 
Impact of Climate Variability on Crop Yields: Hydro-Crop Model Results 
Figure 13 shows the simulated ET for the maize growing season in the five agroecological zones. 
Affected simultaneously by crop water requirements and soil moisture contents, the plots showing actual 
evapotranspiration in the three drier zones (Zones I, IIa1 and IIb) reveal the presence of rising and falling 
                                                       
6 Equation 2.8 in Appendix A. 
7 Equation 2.9 in Appendix A.  
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patterns similar to the rainfall patterns shown in Figure 9. This is because the limiting factor in these 
zones is the available soil water content. However, the actual evapotranspiration patterns in the wetter 
zones (Zones IIa2 and III) follow the potential evapotranspiration patterns shown in Figure 11, because 
the soil water content does not constrain evapotranspiration in these zones (instead, it is controlled by the 
atmospheric water demand).  
Figure 13. Growing period actual evapotranspiration of maize in the agroecological zones, 1976-
2007 
Zones I, IIa1 and IIb 
 
 
Zones IIa2 and III 
 
Source: Results from the hydro-crop model. 
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Simulated relative maize yields for 1976-2007 are shown in Figure 14 for the five agroecological 
zones. Relative yields are defined as the ratio of the simulated actual yield to the maximum yield 
achievable without any water stress. Maize is again chosen as an illustrative example because it is 
Zambia’s major crop. However, the relative yields for the other major crops follow patterns similar to 
those of maize.  
Figure 14. Maize relative yields in the agroecological zones, 1976-2007 (you need to change the 
second word with lower case, i.e. Relative yield 
 
Zones I, IIa1 and IIb 
 
 
Zones IIa2 and III 
 
Source: Results from the hydro-crop model. 
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For Zones I and IIa1, the most severe maize yield reduction occurred in the 1991/92 season, when 
estimated relative yield losses were 77 percent and 65 percent, respectively, of the normal yields. While 
Zone IIb had a 40 percent yield loss in 1991/92, its worst season was in 1994/95 when there was a 54 
percent yield loss for maize. Considerable yield losses are also seen in other seasons for the drier Zones I, 
IIa1 and IIb. These include 1994/95 for Zones I, IIa1 and IIb; 1976/77 for Zones IIa1 and IIb; and 
1983/84, 1986/87 and 2001/02 for Zone IIa1. The relative yield reductions during these seasons range 
from 30 to 50 percent. Figure 14 also shows that there were no major yield losses caused by droughts in 
Zones IIa2 and III. For Zone III, in particular, the highest relative yield reduction was 14 percent in 
1991/92. For Zone IIa2, the highest relative yield loss was 20 percent, occurring in 1988/89. In general, 
the data suggest that Zone IIa2 is much less drought-prone than Zones I, IIa1 and IIb, and drought-
induced crop yield losses in Zone III are rare. 
Table 2 provides information intended to help clarify the nature and consequences of droughts 
and wet events. The table shows the ranges of growing season rainfall, relative yield losses, and the 
frequency of weather events. It also shows the crop water requirement satisfaction index (WRSI), which 
is the ratio of actual to potential evapotranspiration during the growing season (Verdin et al., 2005). Each 
of these indicators is separated across the relevant agroecological zones and event categories. For 
example, we see that the range of growing season rainfall in Zone I for all severe drought years is 405-
499 mm.  
The table indicates that for the three drier zones (Zones I, IIa1 and 11b) only 7 or 8 years out of 
32 years (1976-2007) can be considered ‘normal’ years, in that the amount of rainfall in the growing 
season of that year is within the normal range. This indicates that, in any given year, there is a 75 to 80 
percent chance of there being a drought or too much rain in at least one of these three zones. Furthermore, 
over the 32 years, three severe droughts occurred in Zone I, four in Zone IIa1, and one in Zone IIb, but 
there was no severe drought in the wetter zones (i.e., Zones IIa2 and IIb). During severe drought years, 
Zones I and IIa1 experienced the largest reductions in relative yields (14-77 and 21-65 percent, 
respectively). The average relative water deficit (corresponding to a WRSI value of 100) is usually not as 
high as the relative yield losses experienced during severe droughts. Rather, substantial yield losses are 
usually associated with abnormally low rainfall during critical growing stages. Ultimately, Table 2 
illustrates once again that Zones I, IIa1 and IIb are drought-prone, while major drought damage is rare in 
Zones IIa2 and III. Despite being the wettest zone in the country, very wet weather events are rare in 
Zone III, with only one occurrence during the study period.   
It should be noted that the models used in this study are intended for drought impact assessment, 
and do not examine crop yield losses resulting from floods or water-logging. This is primarily because 
floods are usually highly localized and occur over short durations. Hence, any damage assessment 
requires high-resolution data that is not readily available in Zambia. Furthermore, drought damage is 
more important than flood damage for Zambian agriculture (World Bank, 2008). In any event, the 
analysis of wet events in Tables 1 and 2 provides some measurement of possible flood events, and shows 









a ≤ -1.5) 
Moderate drought 
year 
(-1.5 < Z ≤ -0.5) 
Normal 
year 
(-0.5 < Z ≤ 0.5) 
Moderately 
wet year 
(0.5 < Z ≤ 1.5) 
Very wet 
year 
(Z > 1.5) 
Zone  I  Growing  period  rainfall  (mm)  405-499 481-624 632-751 746-902  971-1031 
 Maize  WRSI
b  (%)  70-96  94-100 96-100 97-100  100 
  Maize yield loss
c (%)  14-77  1-15  0-8  0-10  0 
 Frequency
d  3 8 8  11  2 
Zone  IIa1  Growing  period  rainfall  (mm)  401-506 505-623 711-781 761-887  961-1008 
  Maize  WRSI  (%)  75-95  83-100 94-100 92-100 96-100 
  Maize yield loss (%)  21-65  0-48  7-19  1-23  0-14 
  Frequency  4 9 7 9 3 
Zone IIa2  Growing period rainfall (mm)  -  635-781  765-954  910-1058  1113
e 
  Maize  WRSI  (%)  -  97-100 95-100 95-100  99 
  Maize yield loss (%)  -  1-11  0-17  0-20  2 
  Frequency  -  11 10 10  1 
Zone IIb  Growing period rainfall (mm)  585  578-766  765-858  927-1085  1079-1125 
  Maize  WRSI  (%)  86  86-100 88-100 95-100 97-100 
  Maize yield loss (%)  40  0-44  1-34  0-21  0-10 
  Frequency  1 13 7  8  3 
Zone III  Growing period rainfall (mm)  -  875-987  960-1158  1136-1314  1290 
 Maize  WRSI  (%)  -  98-100  97-100  100-100  100 
  Maize yield loss (%)  -  0-9  0-13  0-0  0 
  Frequency  -  7 18 6  1 
Notes: (a)
 Average monthly Palmer Z Index during maize-growing period (November-March). The Palmer Z index shows how monthly moisture deviates from 
normal conditions and reflects short-term drought or wetness (Palmer 1965; Alley 1984). (b)
 ‘WRSI’ stands for ‘water requirement satisfaction index’ and is the 
ratio of total actual to total potential crop evapotranspiration (see Section 2). (c) Percentage maize yield loss is estimated from the hydrological model. (d) 
Number of years of occurrences during 1976-2007. Using the monthly averaged Palmer Z index and the -1.5 threshold, we did not identify year 1992 as a severe 
drought year in Zone I, even though the estimated maize yield reduction calculated herein (about 77 percent) was the most severe among the five agroecological 
zones. In contrast, the index successfully identified the other severe drought years (1995 and 2005) for Zone I. This is because Zone I received only 22 mm of 
rainfall in February 1992, which is about 13 percent of the rainfall average for this month. This extreme rainfall shortage, which occurred during a critical maize-
growing stage, resulted in dramatic yield losses in 1992. To correct for this discrepancy, we moved 1992 from the ‘moderate’ to ‘severe’ drought category for 
Zone I. (e) Only one very wet event was seen in Zone IIa2 during the 1976-2007 period, and hence we did not report it. The same is true for severe drought in 
Zone IIb and very wet events in Zone III.  
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4. CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:  
COMBINING THE HYDRO-CROP AND DCGE MODELS 
The previous sections examined historical trends in climate variability across Zambia’s five major 
agroecological zones (Section 2) and estimated their annual impact on crop yields over the past three 
decades using a hydro-crop model (Section 3). Drawing on the hydro-crop model results and climate 
variability data, this section assesses the potential impact of future climate variability on economic 
growth, household incomes and poverty using the DCGE model developed for this study.  
The dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model  
Climate variability not only affects crop yields, harvested areas, and agricultural production, it also has 
implications for the entire economy. Moreover, spatial variation in rainfall patterns means that such 
effects can vary across subnational regions. We therefore develop an economywide model with five 
agroecological zones.
8 The model contains detailed information on production, consumption and trade, 
and includes 34 different production sectors, half of which are agricultural crops and livestock. These 
sectors are defined for the five agroecological zones (considered as five representative rural farm groups), 
as well as for large-scale and urban farm groups. The technologies of these representative farm groups 
(together with the nonagricultural production functions) are calibrated using district-level production data 
from the Crop Forecasting Surveys (CFS) and the 2004 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS4) 
obtained from Zambia Ministry of Agriculture and Statistic Bureau. Each farm group can change its 
cropping and livestock patterns and engage more or less intensively in nonfarm activities. Laborers can 
also migrate to urban centers and nonagricultural jobs (both are modeled explicitly). This model therefore 
captures some autonomous adaptation to climate change. However, we limit the extent to which 
representative producers adjust cropping patterns in response to short-term climate variability. We assume 
that land allocations are determined at the start of the season, and that farmers cannot reallocate planted 
land to different crops during the growing season (i.e., land allocations are exogenous in the short-run). 
This assumption is appropriate, since farmers typically cannot predict or respond to climate variation once 
land is planted. They can, however, reallocate mobile resources (e.g., labor) and influence the level of 
production. 
While substitution between factors (labor, land and capital) depends on relative costs, the model 
distinguishes among self-employed agricultural workers, unskilled workers (working in both agriculture 
and nonagriculture), and skilled workers (in nonagriculture only). Information on employment and wages 
is from the LCMS4, while labor supplies are allowed to exogenously expand over time according to 
demographic projections. Capital is immobile across sectors, and, after accounting for annual 
depreciation, is supplemented by past investments allocated according to each sectors’ relative 
profitability. This is the ‘recursive’ dynamic feature of the DCGE model. Total factor inputs are then 
combined with intermediate inputs (e.g., fertilizer and fuels) to produce a total level of output. These 
sector-specific production technologies are taken from a 2006 Zambian social accounting matrix (SAM). 
Producers in each sector/region decide how much output to supply to the national domestic and foreign 
markets based on relative prices. Since Zambia is a small country, we assume that world prices are fixed, 
but also that they are influenced by changes in the real exchange rate, which adjusts to maintain the 
current account balance.  
In order to capture how different households are affected by climate variability and change, the 
model includes 15 representative household groups; these are separated by zone, by rural or urban 
location, and by farm size (e.g., small-scale rural, large-scale rural and urban farmer households). Income 
and expenditure patterns vary across the 15 household groups. This is important for modeling 
distributional change, since incomes generated during farm/nonfarm production accrue to different 
households depending on their location and factor endowments. Households in the model receive factors’ 
                                                      
8 The equations and parameters of the DCGE model are presented in Appendix D.  
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incomes, and then pay taxes, save and make transfers to other households. The remaining income is used 
to consume goods and services, which can either be purchased locally or imported, depending on relative 
prices. Taxes are collected by the government, which also consumes goods and services, while pooled 
savings are used to finance investment spending. Total demand interacts with production and trade (i.e., 
supply) to determine prices. This full specification of supply/demand for commodities and the factors 
using the production and utility functions is the ‘general equilibrium’ feature of the DCGE model. 
Finally, in order to retain as much information as possible on the households’ incomes and expenditure 
patterns, the DCGE model is linked to a microsimulation module based on the LCMS4. Changes in 
consumption for each representative household in the DCGE model are used to adjust the level of 
commodity expenditure of the corresponding household in the LCMS4. The consumption levels are then 
recalculated in the survey, and standard poverty measures are re-estimated. 
The model distinguishes domestic markets from trade with rest of world for the most important 
trading commodities. However, international prices can affect domestic supply and demand through 
imperfect substitution with domestic supply, as well as through the real exchange effect. The linkages 
among different agricultural subsectors and between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors are fully 
captured through income generation, household expenditures, and the use of intermediate inputs. In this 
way, the economywide impacts of climate variability in Zambia can be captured. The detailed data used 
to represent the Zambian economy in 2006, as well as the macroeconomic and sectoral structure of the 
production, are taken from national accounts and crop production data, while data on household incomes 
and expenditures are drawn from the LCMS4. Note that the agricultural season used for the calibrated 
base year of the model is 2005/06. Appendix C provides a detailed description of the DCGE model for 
Zambia.  
Combining the Hydro-Crop and DCGE Models: Designing Scenarios Representing 
Alternative Rainfall Patterns 
The DCGE model is used to simulate the 10-year climate variability between 2006 and 2016 and to assess 
the economic impact of this variability. It is impossible to accurately predict Zambia’s future annual 
rainfall pattern. It is, however, possible to identify a range of possible patterns using historical data and a 
variety of methods developed to simulate future potential rainfall patterns. Here, we use an 'index 
sequential’ method (Prairie et al., 2006). Given 32 years of historical rainfall data for the period 1976-
2007, we can draw 32 different rainfall patterns each of which has 10 years to corresponding to 
simulating period of 2007-2016 (i.e., 32 different starting years chosen from years of 1976-2007 with 10 
consecutive years to form a sequence). This method preserves the original inter-annual rainfall patterns 
inherent in the observed climate data of 1976-2007. We include all 32 of the possible 10-year rainfall 
patterns in our analysis, thereby capturing the full distribution of past climate variability. This approach 
has the advantage of greatly reducing the number of possible rainfall scenarios, while also capturing any 
interdependencies of rainfall patterns across consecutive years. 
Thus, the starting point (or the base year) of the DCGE model is 2006, which is the most recent 
year for which all of the necessary data are available. We first apply the DCGE model to a scenario with 
‘normal’ rainfall pattern for the 10 years between 2007 and 2016 (i.e., during the simulated 10 years there 
are no adverse effects from climate variability on the economy). Because of this insulation from climate 
variability, crop yields are assumed to be stable. Moreover, yield levels and land allocation are assumed 
to grow steadily according to estimated yield potentials drawn from field trials and historical trends in 
land expansion, respectively (see Thurlow et al., 2008). We call this scenario ‘normal rainfall without 
climate variability’ (or ‘normal rainfall’). We then develop 32 scenarios (each with a period of 10 years) 
to simulate the economic impact of the different rainfall patterns discussed above. The various rainfall 
patterns and the economywide model are linked through the imposition of crop yield shocks in the model. 
These yield shocks are consistent with the Hydro-crop model results discussed in the previous section, 
and are applied on a crop-by-crop basis for each of the five agroecological zones. This procedure is 
repeated for all 32 scenarios, each of which is for the period of 10 years. As farmers are unable to predict  
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rainfall patterns and droughts often occur after planting, farmers are usually unable to change land 
allocation to avoid drought-induced yield loss. Accordingly, in the model we assume that land allocation 
within each year is fixed by crop. Given that more than 80 percent of the rain-fed crop areas in Zambia 
are planted with maize, and drought-resistant crops, such as cassava and sorghum, have significant spatial 
patterns, this assumption seems to be more reasonable than the flexible land allocation assumption that is 
commonly used in many other CGE models. However, although farmers are unable to reallocate land to 
other crops, they can reallocate other inputs (e.g., labor, capital and intermediate inputs) in response to 
climate variability. For example, they may switch labor and capital to other agricultural and 
nonagricultural activities (e.g., by participating in off-farm activities as workers) in response to drought-
induced changes in agricultural prices and nonagricultural employment opportunities. 
Apart from imposing the yield shocks drawn from the crop model, we also account for other 
transmission channels through whic1h extreme rainfall variation can affect the agricultural sector and the 
rest of the economy. These additional non-yield impacts, which only occur when there is a severe drought 
or flood event,
9 are summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3. Climate variability and severe drought/flood event impact channels assumed in the 
economywide model 
Impact channel  Affected sectors  Description of impact 
All 10 years in each of the 32 scenarios   
Crop yields  Rain-fed crops  Level of yield reduced based on the crops’ WRSI 
Years with severe drought events that reflect rainfall patterns in 1983/84, 1986/87, 1991/92, 1994/95 and 2001/02 
Crop area expansion  Rain-fed crops  Crop land expansion that would take place in a 
normal year is eliminated in the drought year and 
remains at zero in the immediate post-drought 
year 
Livestock stocks  Livestock sectors  Livestock stocks decline in the drought year and 
the growth in these stocks gradually returns to 
normal year rates over the two subsequent years, 
with diminishing lagged effects  
Physical capital accumulation   All sectors  Capital depreciation rates are increased in the 
drought year and gradually return to normal year 
levels over the two subsequent years, with 
diminishing lagged effects  
Major flood year (2006/07)     
Agricultural land expansion  Crop sectors  Land area under cultivation declines in the flood 
year, then returns to pre-flood levels in the 
immediate post-flood year 




                                                      
9 Major drought events are defined for a particular agro-climatic zone as being years in which the WRSI index is two 
standard deviations or more below the mean for the period of 32 years (1976-2007). For Zone IIa1 this occurred in the following 
seasons: 1983/84, 1986/87, 1991/92, 1994/95 and 2001/02. Due to a lack of data to support the modeling of floods, only the 
2007/08 season is herein identified as a major flood event.   
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Climate variability can also affect the harvested crop areas. Compared to the ‘normal’ scenario, 
the harvested areas for drought-affected crops are reduced in severe drought years and then slowly 
recover over the subsequent two years, reflecting a post-drought recovery period. Similarly, cultivated 
land area also declines during a major flood event, thereby reflecting the situation observed in reality 
(World Bank, 2008). Livestock stocks and the productivity of livestock production are also affected by a 
severe drought.
10 The recovery of livestock stocks to normal levels is assumed to take about two years. 
Thus, there is a lagged but diminishing effect on livestock stocks and productivity in the second and third 
years following a severe drought or flood. Severe drought is also assumed to affect other types of physical 
capital through a higher than normal depreciation rate. This reflects deterioration or greater 
underutilization of capital stocks. As with livestock stocks, there is a lagged effect on the recovery of the 
capital depreciation rate following a severe drought or flood, with the depreciation rate returning to its 
normal-year levels over a two-year period. Thus, while crop yield losses are the primary impact channel, 
the economywide model also captures numerous other possible channels through which climate 
variability and extreme drought/flood events can affect production and productivity in both agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors.  
Economywide Impacts of Climate Variability: DCGE Model Results  
Climate Variability will Cost Zambia US$4.3 Billion in Foregone GDP over 10 Years 
In the first scenario, the economywide model simulates a normal rainfall situation over a 10–year period 
(2006-2016); the results are shown in column 3 of Table 2 (labeled ‘normal seasons’). In the absence of 
climate variability, Zambia’s GDP grows at 6.7 percent per year between 2007 and 2016 with 2006 being 
the base year.
11 This result is shown as the ‘normal sequence’ line in Figure 15, with national GDP rising 
from US$10.2 billion in 2006 to $US19.6 billion by 2016. Growth by sectors is reported in Table 4, 
together with the contributions of the agricultural, industrial, and services sectors to the economy in the 
beginning and ending years (i.e. 2006 and 2016). Table 4 also reports the model’s results for poverty 
reduction. As shown in the table, the nonagricultural sectors grow more rapidly than the agricultural 
sector, which causes the share of agriculture in the national economy to decline from 20.5 percent in 2006 
to 18.6 percent by 2016. The most rapid growth is in ‘industry other than manufacturing mining’ 
(‘manufacturing mining’ being the other industry subsector), which shows an 8.5 percent annual growth 
between 2007 and 2016. However, the rapid growth in the ‘other industry’ category, which is dominated 
by construction, has only a modest contribution to the overall economic growth as it is a rather small 
subsector, accounting for 8.7 percent of GDP initially (2006) and 10.3 percent by the end of the simulated 
period (2016). 
Although an annual growth rate of 6.7 percent is impressive, the extremely high poverty rate in 




                                                      
10 This severity of a drought is measured using the WRSI index for maize in each region. 
11 Under the normal rainfall scenario, both agricultural and nonagricultural sectors grow steadily during the period 2007-
2016. Crop yield and livestock productivity grow according to the potentials defined by Zambia’s Agricultural Research Institute 
(see Thurlow et al. 2008), while growth in the nonagricultural sector is based on the continuous trend of rapid growth 
experienced by this sector over the past five years (2004-2008). 
12 Zambia’s national poverty rate was 70 percent in 1991. Poverty reduction in Zambia was slow during the 1990s due to a 
series of macroeconomic reforms and external shocks that imposed significant adjustment costs on households, especially in 
urban areas (Thurlow and Wobst, 2006). Rural poverty declined towards the end of the 1990s due mainly to a rapid expansion of 
export agriculture in some parts of the country. Beginning in 2000, there was a large expansion of mining and other industries, 
which are typically less poverty-reducing than other sources of growth (Breisinger and Thurlow, 2008; Thurlow and Wobst, 
2006). Accordingly, Zambia’s poverty-growth elasticity is considerably lower than of other African countries (Diao et al., 2007).   
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Table 4. Growth and poverty outcomes under the normal rainfall scenario, 2007-2016 
 Average  annual  growth 
rate, 2007-2016 (%) 
Share of total GDP (%) 
 2006  2016 
Gross domestic product (GDP)  6.7  100.0  100.0 
   Agriculture  5.7  20.5  18.6 
   Mining  5.9  10.1  9.4 
   Manufacturing  7.3  12.1  12.8 
   Other industries  8.5  8.7  10.3 
   Services  6.7  48.6  48.9 
  Share of total population, 
2006 (%) 
Poverty headcount (%) 
 2006  2016 
Poverty headcount 100.0  67.9  52.2 
   Rural  60.9  77.6  63.0 
   Urban  39.1  52.8  35.4 
Source: Results from the Zambian DCGE model. 
 
We then simulate 32 different rainfall patterns derived from the historical rainfall data using the 
index sequential method described in Section 3.2. Obviously, climate variability is expected to reduce the 
growth in GDP through the various impact channels discussed above. The extent of GDP reduction varies 
across the different rainfall scenarios, which reflect all possible 10-year sequential patterns drawn from 
the historical rainfall data. To assess the potential losses in GDP due to climate variability, it is not 
necessary to display all of the results from these 32 scenarios. Instead, we herein report the mean results 
across the 32 different scenarios, together with the results from the ‘worst rainfall’ scenario, which is 
defined later in this section.  
The mean GDP level averaged across all 32 rainfall scenarios is shown as the ‘sequence average’ 
in Figure 15.
13 When we project forward all possible 10-year historical rainfall patterns, we see that 
climate variability may reduce Zambia’s GDP by US$0.8 billion by the end of the 10-year period in 2016 
(measured in 2006 prices). The size of Zambia’s economy is therefore 4 percent smaller by 2016 than it 
would have been in the same year without climate variability. The accumulated GDP losses due to 
climate variability over the 10-year period (2007-2016) reach US$4.3 billion. This is equivalent to 
lowering Zambia’s annual GDP growth by 0.4 percent points each year between 2007 and 2016.  
We identify the worst rainfall scenario as the 10-year period having the highest annual 
precipitation coefficient of variation (CV) and the highest number of severe drought events; this 
corresponds to the historical rainfall patterns of 1986-1995. Table 5 summarizes the rainfall patterns of 
this period and shows that the three most severe drought events all occurred during this 10-year period in 
the scenario (see also Tables 1 and 2 for further details). 
The DCGE model simulation shows that if the rainfall patterns over Zambia’s next 10 years 
replicate the worst rainfall patterns of 10 sequencing years in the history of 1976-2007, then the 
accumulated total losses in GDP would be US$7.1 billion over the 10-year period of 2007-2016. This is 
almost twice the mean accumulated losses averaged from all of the possible rainfall patterns discussed 
above, and is equivalent to reducing Zambia’s annual GDP growth by 0.9 percentage points each year. 
Moreover, the Zambian economy would be 8.1 percent smaller by 2016 under these conditions than it 
would have been under a normal rainfall scenario. In other words, total the GDP in 2016 would be 
US$1.6 billion below what it would have been without any climate variability. 
                                                      
13 To simplify the charts shown in the figure, we do not display the level of GDP under all 32 rainfall scenarios and only 




Figure 15. Losses in total GDP due to climate variability, 2007-2016  
 
Note: Ten-year losses are the cumulative losses for the entire 2007-2016 period.  
Source: Results from the Zambian DCGE model. 
 
Climate variability therefore has a profound effect on economic growth in Zambia, and the losses 
associated with the worst rainfall scenario in Zambia’s history are substantial. As the economic losses 
associated with climate variability are assessed based on historical rainfall data, it is possible for us to 
apply the model results to the past GDP performance observed during 1976-2007. If climate variability 
had not caused GDP growth to fall by 0.4 percentage points annually across 1976-2007, then Zambia’s 
economy, measured by GDP, would have been US$1.5 billion (or 12.8 percent) higher than its actual 
value (in 2006, given in 2006 prices). In other words, on average, Zambia lost 0.4 percent of growth 
annually between 1977 and 2007 due to climate variability, and the accumulated cost for this period was 
US$13.8 billion (in 2006 prices). Thus, while Zambia has indeed undergone several decades of 
unsuccessful policies and substantial structural reforms, and has suffered from a number of large external 
shocks that resulted in huge economic costs and decreased growth, climate variability has contributed 
significantly to the country’s poor economic performance and lowered economic growth, even over the 
























































Table 5. Rainfall patterns in 1985/86-1994/95 – the worst period of 10 years 






























  Growing 
period rainfall 
(mm) 
Total 807 547 739 850 758 607  561 797 648 430    
Monthly min.  131 86 118 135 163 117  22 174 123 89    
Monthly max.  243 136 234 328 249 146  206 262 173 123    
Event occurrences  modest 
wet 
severe 
drought normal  modest 



















  Growing 
period rainfall 
(mm) 
Total 867 583 622 981 832 655  482 785 553 414    
Monthly min.  155 58 140 132 132 126  33 134 123 83    
Monthly max.  240 181 175 416 374 180  117 235 158 129    

























  Growing 
period rainfall 
(mm) 
Total 1,095 794 877 1,014 1,001 735  670 997 712 669    
Monthly min.  206 124 129 134 222 136  56 215 118 131    
Monthly max.  297 230 268 353 288 256  173 257 236 215    
Event occurrences  modest 
wet 
modest 






















  Growing 
period rainfall 
(mm) 
Total 827 695 814 975 747 811  601 1,094 722 622    
Monthly min.  117 147 145 206 170 175  88 146 155 95    
Monthly max.  226 162 228 289 253 246  190 346 275 263    

























  Growing 
period rainfall 
(mm) 
Total 1,210 1,055 1,125 1,140 1,112 1,147  936 1,146 987 963    
Monthly min.  220 231 221 186 231 203  164 213 153 193    
Monthly max.  268 241 274 281 261 381  247 299 255 265    
Event occurrences  modest 
wet  normal normal  normal normal normal modest 
drought  normal  modest 
drought 
modest 
drought  0 0 
Note: The average monthly minimum rainfall is for the December to February period (i.e., the peak growing period).   
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Climate Variability Lowers Agricultural Growth by 1 Percent Point Each Year  
As expected, climate variability has a much larger negative impact on agricultural performance than on 
overall economic growth. Figure 16 shows the impact of climate variability on agricultural GDP. Under 
the normal rainfall scenario, agricultural GDP rises from US$2.1 billion in 2006 to US$3.6 billion by 
2016 with a 5.7 percent annual growth rate (see Table 4). Because agricultural GDP growth is lower than 
total GDP growth (5.8 percent) agriculture’s share of GDP falls from 20.4 to 18.6 percent during 2007-16 
under the normal rainfall scenario. However, this gradual decline in the importance of agriculture is still 
fairly optimistic given that this sector that is the most vulnerable to climate variability. The results from 
the DCGE model reveal the high sensitivity of agricultural GDP to varying rainfall patterns. On average, 
climate variability causes a total loss in agricultural GDP of US$2.2 billion over the 10-year period. This 
is equivalent to an annual 1 percent point reduction in agriculture’s growth rate. With this decrease in the 
annual growth rate, the agricultural GDP in 2016 will be US$0.3 billion below what it would have been 
under the normal rainfall scenario. Thus, climate variability greatly reduces Zambia’s chances of 
achieving its national agricultural growth target of 6 percent per year, as set by the Comprehensive 
African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP).
14 As agriculture is particularly vulnerable to 
climate variability, losses in agricultural GDP account for more than half of the overall projected 
economic losses, even though the sector comprises only one fifth of the economy. 
 
Figure 16. Losses in agricultural GDP due to climate variability, 2007-2016  
 
Note: Ten-year losses are cumulative for the entire 2007-2016 period, and do not just represent the loss in the final 
year. 
Source: Results from the Zambian DCGE model. 
 
Agricultural losses are especially severe under the worst rainfall scenario, which replicates the 
rainfall patterns of the 10-year period between 1985/86 and 1994/95. If these rainfall patterns were to 
repeat themselves over the next 10 years (between 2007 and 2016), then the accumulated agricultural 
GDP losses would amount to US$3.1 billion. This means that under the worst scenario, agricultural GDP 
is 10.2 percent lower than it would have been under the normal scenario. This is a substantial contraction 
                                                      
14 CAADP, which is an initiative of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), is a compact 
among African countries to promote agricultural development and poverty reduction. Zambia will soon become a signatory (see 






















































of the agricultural sector and reflects the severity of the three droughts that took place during 1985-1995. 
Under the worst rainfall scenario, agriculture’s average annual GDP growth rate during 2007-2016 would 
be 2.3 percentage points lower than that under the normal rainfall scenario. Such a large decline in 
agricultural production would severely undermine the country’s development efforts. 
Eighty-five Percent of the National Agricultural GDP Losses Caused by Climate Variability 
Occur in Zones I and IIa1 
As examined in Section 2, there is considerable variation in rainfall across Zambia’s five agroecological 
zones. By disaggregating the country into five different zones, the economywide model is able to capture 
spatial variation in the economic losses caused by climate variability. Similarly, the zonal-level 
contribution to the national agricultural economy varies significantly across the five zones. Table 6 
reports the zonal shares of agricultural GDP and national maize production, a sector that is particularly 
vulnerable to climate shocks. Drought-prone Zones I and IIa are an important part of Zambia’s 
agricultural economy, generating more than half of national agricultural GDP, and almost two-thirds of 
national maize production.  
Table 6. Agricultural GDP and national maize production by agroecological zone, 2006 
 Agricultural  GDP Maize  production 
  Value (US$ mil.)  Share (%)  Level (1000 mt)  Share (%) 
National 2,095  100.0  1,368  100.0 
   Zone I  128  6.1  169  12.3 
   Zone IIa1  1,016  48.5  692  50.6 
   Zone IIa2  174  8.3  179  13.1 
   Zone IIb  5  0.3  24  1.7 
   Zone III  474  22.6  304  22.2 
   Forestry  297  14.2  -  - 
Note: The Zambian model does not disaggregate the forestry sector across zones. 
Source: 2006 Zambian SAM and the DCGE model. 
 
Zones 1 and IIa1, which represent a relatively large share of national maize production, 
experience high climate variability. Thus, agriculture in these zones often suffers significantly from bad 
rainfall patterns. This phenomenon is captured in Figure 17, which separately presents the agricultural 
GDP growth paths for three selected zones: the two with the highest climate variability (Zones I and IIa1) 
versus the one with the lowest climate variability (Zone III). The accumulated losses for zonal-level 
agriculture are, on average, US$0.17 billion in Zone I, which had the smallest agricultural GDP of 
US$0.14 billion in 2006. The accumulated losses are US$1.68 billion for Zone IIa1, which had an initial 
agricultural GDP of more than US$1 billion. In contrast, even though agricultural GDP is about US$0.5 
billion in Zone III, the accumulated losses due to climate variability in this zone are only US$0.16 billion, 
which is considerably smaller than those for Zone IIa1 (see Figure 17). This means that almost 85 percent 
of the national agricultural GDP loss occurs in Zones I and IIa1, whereas Zone III is relatively unaffected 
by climate variability. Higher climate variability also transfers into lower zonal economic growth rates. 
While growth in national agricultural GDP is, on average, 1 percentage point lower due to climate 
variability, larger declines in agricultural growth occur in Zones I and IIa1 (1.3 and 1.6 percentage points, 
respectively), and a more modest decline is seen in Zone III (0.37 percentage points). Table 7, which 
summarizes the spatial distribution of the costs of climate variability for all five agroecological zones, 
clearly shows that the economic cost of climate variability falls heavily on Zambia’s southern and central 
zones and declines rapidly to the north.  
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Note: Ten-year losses are cumulative for the entire 2007-2016 period, and do not just represent the loss in the final 
year.  

















































































































































Table 7. Impacts of climate variability on agricultural GDP by agroecological zone, 2007-2016 
  Average rainfall scenario  Worst rainfall scenario 
























National  -1.01  2,213 99.4  -2.29 3,132 98.9 
Zone  I  -1.28  172 7.8  -4.63  302 9.6 
Zone IIa1  -1.58  1,682  76.0 -3.52  2,442  78.0 
Zone IIa2  -0.93  182  8.2 -1.64 175  5.6 
Zone IIb  -0.86  5  0.2 -2.44  9  0.3 
Zone III  -0.37  158  7.1 -0.94 169  5.4 
Note: Agricultural GDP at the zonal level excludes forestry, which is not disaggregated in the model. Total zonal 
impacts are below national impacts. Ten-year losses are cumulative for the whole 2006-2016 period, and do not 
represent only the loss in the final year.  
Source: Results from the Zambian economywide model. 
 
If Zambia’s rainfall patterns of 2007-2016 were to replicate those of the 1985/86 to 1994/95 
period (i.e., the worst rainfall scenario), then the economic losses caused by climate variability would be 
even more heavily concentrated in Zones I and IIa1. As shown in Table 7, almost 90 percent of the losses 
in agricultural GDP would take place in these two southern and central zones. Moreover, the effects of the 
worst rainfall scenario would be especially severe for the southern Zone I, where the droughts of the early 
to mid-1990s were pronounced. In contrast, Zones IIa2 and III would be less affected by this worst 
rainfall scenario compared to the other zones, because neither zone experienced severe drought conditions 
during the historical period (see Table1). This highlights the spatial complexities of Zambia’s rainfall 
patterns and the importance of considering spatial variation when assessing the consequences of climate 
variability. For instance, while national agricultural GDP losses increase by 40 percent under the worst 
rainfall scenario, they increase by 75 percent in drought-prone Zone I.  
Climate Variability Reduces Maize Production by at Least 30 kg Per Capita and Jeopardizes 
Food Security 
The DCGE model includes detailed crop and livestock production data disaggregated across the five 
agroecological zones. This allows us to estimate impacts on food crop production, and by implication, on 
food security. We herein focus on maize production because maize is one of the most important food 
crops in Zambia, and it is grown and consumed throughout the country. While cassava is also an 
important food crop, it grows mainly in Northern Zambia and is less vulnerable to climate variability than 
maize. In Section 3 we presented the hydro-crop model estimates of the impact of climate variability on 
maize yields using historical data for the past 32 years. In this section, we estimate the impact of climate 
variability on maize production and then extend this to examine its economywide effect on aggregate 
economic indicators (GDP and agricultural GDP). Figure 18 shows these effects on maize production at 
the national level as well as for the two largest maize production zones in the country (Zones I and III). 
The figure shows that without climate variability, maize production grows at 4.8 percent per year from 
2.7 million tons in 2006 to 4.3 million tons by 2016. This is a result of expansion in the maize-cultivated 
area and improvements in maize yields.
15 The negative effect of climate variability on maize production 
occurs primarily through lowering yields, together with modest declines in the cultivated land area during 
major drought and flood seasons (see Table 3 for the main channels through which climate variability 
                                                      
15 Under the normal rainfall scenario, the cultivated area under maize production increases from 1.4 million hectares in 2006 
to 1.8 million hectares in 2016. During the same period, national average maize yields rise from 2.2 to 2.6 tons per hectare. Note 
that yields are calculated using harvested (not planted) land area.   
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affects crop production). Accordingly, as shown in Figure 18, national maize production falls below that 
estimated under the normal rainfall scenario once climate variability is account for.  




Note: Ten-year losses are cumulative for the whole 2007-2016 period, and do not represent only the loss in the final 
year. 





























































































































The cumulative losses in maize production over the entire 2007-2016 period are 4 million tons on 
average. This is equivalent to an annual 1.5 percentage point decrease in maize production growth. 
Almost all of the losses are concentrated in Zone IIa1, where climate variability is high and where most of 
the country’s maize producers (including larger-scale farmers) are situated. In contrast, Zone III, which is 
also a major maize-producing region, is far less affected by climate variability. Moreover, when there are 
severe southern droughts but relatively normal conditions elsewhere, the less drought-stricken regions 
benefit slightly; farmers in these areas can expand their maize production in response to maize price 
increases caused by droughts in the other parts of the country. Such expansion in maize production is the 
result of more intensive farming through the application of additional inputs, since land allocations are 
determined at the start of a given season. By devoting more labor and other inputs towards maize 
production, farmers in the less drought-stricken regions improve land productivity and reduce the gap 
between planted area and harvested area. However, while the economywide model captures these 
‘adaptive’ responses or regional linkages, the effect is relatively small due to land constraints and the 
farmers’ inability to predict extreme drought and flood events elsewhere in the country. As such, the 
increase in Zone II maize production during southern drought years is relatively small.  
One measure of food security is per capita food availability supplied by domestic production. 
Table 8 shows per capita maize production for the five agroecological zones and for the country as a 
whole. Per capita maize production in 2006 averages 125 kilograms (kg) per person at the national level. 
Although maize is grown throughout Zambia, its share of household consumption baskets varies due to 
differences in crop mix patterns across the agroecological zones. Per capita maize production is lowest in 
the western Zone IIb, where households consume larger shares of sorghum and millet. Similarly, per 
capita maize production in Zone III is lower than the national average, since cassava is grown more 
widely in this zone. However, despite these spatial differences in maize dependency, this crop is a 
reasonable measure of food security at the national and zonal levels, given that its availability is generally 
close to or more than 100 kg per person across all zones in a normal rainfall year.  
Table 8. Per capita maize production by agroecological zone, 2006 and 2016 
    Average per capita maize production (50kg bags per person) 
   I  IIa1  IIa2  IIb  III  All 
2006  Initial  2.77 3.03 2.69 0.86 1.84 2.49 
2016  Normal  scenario 3.65 3.98 3.57 1.12 2.43 3.29 
  Avg.    scenario  3.26 3.26 3.37 0.99 2.39 2.90 
  Worst  scenario  2.15 2.39 3.24 0.64 2.27 2.34 
Source: Results from the Zambian economywide model. 
 
The model results indicate that under the normal rainfall scenario, maize production grows faster 
than the population, and the per capita availability of maize rises from 125 kg in 2006 to 165 kg by 2016. 
This level meets domestic food and feed demands for maize even with the projected 6.7 percent annual 
GDP growth. However, as discussed above, climate variability lowers maize production, causing the per 
capita availability to rise to 145 kg per person by 2016, only 20 kg more than the current (2006) level. 
Moreover, if the rainfall patterns over the next 10 years are similar to those described under the worst 
rainfall scenario, the per capita maize availability supplied by domestic production by 2016 declines to a 
level below that seen in 2006. The detrimental effects of climate variability on food security are 
especially pronounced in drought-prone Zones I and IIa1. Climate variability therefore greatly reduces 
food availability in Zambia, necessitating food imports and aid during periods of severe droughts. 
Climate Variability will Keep 300,000 More People in Poverty over the Next Decade 
Apart from its adverse effects on basic food security, climate variability has large impacts on household 
incomes and poverty. This can be seen in Figure 19, which shows the simulated national poverty  
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headcount rate over the next 10 years. The poverty rate is the share of the population whose per capita 
expenditure falls beneath the national poverty line.
16 According to this welfare measure, poverty under the 
normal rainfall scenario falls from 67.9 percent in 2006 to 52.2 percent in 2016.
17 This is still insufficient 
to meet the first MDG of halving 1992 poverty by 2015 (i.e., achieving a poverty headcount of 36.1 
percent), in part because gains in poverty reduction to date have been relatively modest in Zambia. 
However, poverty reductions under the normal rainfall scenario are sufficient to offset a projected 
population growth of 2 percent per year, such that the absolute number of poor people falls from 7.44 
million in 2006 to 6.96 million in 2016. This would be first time that the absolute number of poor in the 
country had declined since poverty was first measured in Zambia in 1992.  
Figure 19. Increases in the national poverty headcount rate due to climate variability, 2007-2016 
 
Source: Results from the Zambian DCGE model. 
 
However, climate variability will slow poverty reduction over the next 10 years. As shown in 
Figure 19, the national poverty rate averaged across the 32 rainfall scenario scenarios (the line called 
‘sequence average’) is above the line representing the national poverty rate under the normal rainfall 
scenario. On average, climate variability increases national poverty by 2.3 percentage points by the end of 
the 10-year period. There are thus 300,000 more people living under the poverty line in 2016 than there 
would have been without climate variability. Under the worst rainfall scenario, the national poverty rate is 
4.9 percentage points higher by 2016 and there are 650,000 more people living under the poverty line in 
2016 compared to under the normal rainfall scenario. This is enough to offset any reduction in the number 
of poor people in Zambia, meaning that the absolute number of poor will not decline by 2016. Thus, if 
Zambia were to experience a 10-year rainfall pattern similar to that of 1984/85 to 1994/95, then most of 
the country’s potential reductions in poverty over the next 10 years would be lost, and the number of poor 
people in Zambia would rise from its current 7.4 million to 7.6 million by 2016.  
Finally, Figure 20 shows the impact of climate variability on rural and urban poverty. The results 
indicate that while agriculture is the primary impact channel through which climate variability affects the 
Zambian economy, it has implications for poverty reduction in both rural and urban areas. This is true for 
two reasons. First, one third of Zambia’s urban population is engaged in agricultural production (Thurlow 
                                                      
16 The national poverty line in 2004/05 was US$300 per person per year or US$0.8 per day. Converted to 2006 current 
prices, the poverty line is US$496 per person per year or US$1.36 per day. 
17 The 2005/05 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) is used to estimate poverty changes due to the unavailability 
of the 2006/07 survey. The economywide model is benchmarked to 2006, and we have to effectively assume that poverty did not 





































































et al. 2008), meaning that while agricultural incomes are not especially important in urban areas, changes 
in rainfall patterns can affect urban incomes. Second, and more importantly, food consumption is a large 
share of urban households’ expenditure baskets. Thus, real urban incomes are influenced by changes in 
agricultural production and prices. As a result, the declines in agricultural production caused by climate 
variability and the resulting increases in food prices will reduce urban real incomes. Accordingly, two 
fifths of the increase in poverty caused by climate variability takes place in urban areas (e.g., 133,000 
people out of 300,000 at the national level), further indicating the importance of measuring the 
economywide effects of climate variability (i.e., beyond direct impacts on agricultural production and 
farmers). This is particularly true when estimating welfare implications, which will be pronounced in 
Zambia. 






























































































































Severe Droughts and Floods Dramatically Lower Growth and Increase Poverty in Drought/Flood 
Years 
The above analysis focuses on the economic impact of climate variability over a period of 10 years and 
does not examine specific effects in any particular year. This analysis is important for improving our 
understanding of the general impact of climate variability over relatively longer periods. However, by 
focusing on alternative climate scenarios, it does not reflect the severity of economic impacts during 
particularly severe drought or flood years. Thus, in this subsection we present some results from a single 
year in which a drought or flood occurs. We call such effects the ‘immediate impact’ of drought/flood. 
More specifically, we present the economic costs for a year in which a severe drought occurs (e.g., 
1991/92), a year in which a modest drought occurs (e.g., 1994/95), and a year in which a severe flood 
occurs (e.g., 2006/07). In order to make the results from the three events comparable, we adopt the same 
starting point for each of the three simulations (i.e., the same level and structure of economic activity). In 
each of the three climate shock scenarios, we impose the shock at the same point in time, in this case the 
second year in the model simulation (i.e., 2007). Thus, for example, we are not estimating the impact of 
the actual 1991/92 drought, but rather we ask what the impact would be of a similar magnitude drought 
were it to take place in 2007. Since we ask the same question for the 1994/95 drought and the 2006/07 
flood, we can then directly compare the results from the three climate shock scenarios. 
Figure 21 shows the impact of such climate shocks in an individual year on total and agricultural 
GDP. A severe drought of the same magnitude as the one experienced in 1991/92 would cause national 
agricultural GDP to decline by 22.7 percent compared with a normal rainfall situation in the same year. 
This national-level outcome is driven by large declines in agricultural production in the three zones that 
are the most drought-affected (Zones I, IIa1 and IIb). Overall, the collapse in agricultural production and 
the negative impacts taking place in other sectors of the economy cause total GDP to fall by 6.6 percent in 
this year. A modest drought similar to the one that took place in 1994/95 could also produce large 
negative outcomes if repeated in the future. Total GDP falls by 4.0 percent, and the adverse effects of the 
drought are again concentrated in Zambia’s three drought-prone zones, albeit with some declines in the 
agricultural GDP of Zone III due to the wider coverage of the 1994/95 drought (see Table 2). In contrast, 
a severe flood similar to the one experienced during 2006/07, affects zones more evenly but has a less 
pronounced impact on the overall economy. Thus, while the agricultural GDP of Zone III declines the 
most under severe flood conditions, the impact on other zones is far smaller than that seen under even the 
modest drought scenario. As a result, total GDP only declines by 2.3 percent under the severe flood 
scenario, which is well below the declines in GDP seen under either of the two drought scenarios.  
Severe droughts and floods also have large impacts on household incomes in affected years. 
Figure 22 shows changes in the poverty headcount in a year reflecting each of the three climate shock 
scenarios. The national poverty rate rises dramatically by 7.5 percentage points in a year of severe 
drought. Were this severe drought to take place in 2007, the number of poor people is projected to 
increase by 836,000 from the level in the same year without drought.
18 Poverty also rises significantly in a 
modest drought year, as the poverty rate increases by 3.9 percentage points and the absolute number of 
poor people rises by 435,000. Finally, the national poverty rate rises by 2.4 percentage points in a severe 
flood year, pushing 273,000 more people below the poverty line in that year.  
 
                                                      
18 The percentage point increase in the poverty rate would remain largely unchanged irrespective of the year in which the 
drought takes place. However, the absolute increase in poor people obviously depends on the size of the population, which is 
increasing over time. We herein model the impact of droughts and floods in the second year of the model simulation (i.e., 2007), 
when the total population of Zambia was 11.2 million.   
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Figure 21. Changes in GDP during severe drought and flood years  
 
Note: ‘Severe drought’ reflects the climate conditions in 1991/92, ‘modest drought’ reflects those in 1994/95, and 
‘severe flood’ corresponds to 2006/07. Zonal agricultural GDP excludes forestry, but this parameter is included in 
the national agricultural and total GDP.  
Source: Results from the Zambian DCGE model.  
 
Figure 22. Changes in poverty headcount rate during severe drought and flood years  
  
Note: ‘Severe drought’ reflects the climate conditions in 1991/92, ‘modest drought’ reflects those of 1994/95, and 
‘severe flood’ corresponds to those of 2006/07. The zonal poverty rates are for farm households only (i.e., 80 
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Source: Results from the Zambian DCGE model.  
Table 9 summarizes the findings from the above analysis of the impacts of climate variability on 
economic growth and poverty. The results clearly indicate that climate variability has large adverse 
consequences for both economic growth and poverty reduction. In the next section, we examine 
alternative investments that may help reduce these consequences.  
Table 9. Summary of key results from the impact assessment of climate variability  
  Ten-year climate scnearios  One-year drought and flood events 










Change in GDP growth rates  (%-point)     
   Total GDP  -0.43  -0.90  -6.6  -4.0  -2.3 
   Agricultural GDP  -1.01  -2.29  -22.7  -15.7  -9.4 
Cumulative or total loss in GDP, 2006-16 (US$ billion)       
   Total GDP  4.3  7.1  2.6  1.6  0.9 
   Agricultural GDP  2.2  3.1  1.8  1.2  0.7 
Change in national poverty (%-point)      
  2.2  4.9 7.5 3.9 2.4 
Increase in absolute poor (1000s)      
 300  648  836  435  273 
Notes: Ten-year losses are cumulative for the whole 2007-2016 period measured in 2006 prices. One-year total 
losses are for the year in which the extreme climate event takes place (also measured in 2006 prices). ‘Severe 
drought’ replicates the 1991/92 drought, ‘modest drought’ replicates the 1994/95 drought, and ‘severe flood’ 
replicates the 2006/07 flood. 
Source: Results from the Zambian DCGE model. 
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5. ADDITIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON GROWTH AND POVERTY  
Climate Change and Agricultural Crop Yields: Hydro-Crop Model Results 
Even with present mitigation measures, the current scientific consensus holds that greenhouse gas 
emissions and atmospheric concentrations are set to increase for some decades to come. Furthermore, 
global mean surface temperatures will continue to rise long after emissions have peaked. This global 
warming is expected to affect global water and food systems in profound ways, as identified by the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2007a). The most serious of these impacts will be mediated 
via water due to hydrological changes (Rogers 2008). However, in addition to water, two other opposing 
factors that may also determine the impacts of climate change on agriculture: rising atmospheric CO2 
concentrations should increase yields through a process known as ‘carbon fertilization,’ while rising 
temperatures may substantially reduce yields for some crops. However, among these three factors, 
changes in the availability of water caused by climate change will have the largest consequences for 
agriculture (Houghton 2004; Hulme 1996).  
Given Zambia’s latitude, temperature increases caused by climate change are likely to reduce 
crop yields in the country. Conversely, studies have shown that the effects of carbon fertilization should 
raise crop yields.
19 Given the uncertainties surrounding these opposing impacts, especially at the national 
and per-crop levels, the effects of temperature change and carbon fertilization on crop yields are not 
examined in this study. Instead, we focus on the yield impacts caused by hydrological changes. 
A number of global climate change scenarios have been simulated. Here, we use the SRES B1a 
scenario of the HadCM3 model, which is a coupled atmosphere-ocean general circulation model 
developed at the Hadley Centre (henceforth referred to as HadCM3/B1a).
20 From this scenario, we obtain 
mean changes in precipitation, minimum and maximum daily average temperatures, relative humidity, 
and wind speed for grid cells in Zambia for the next 20 years (until 2025). The HadCM3/B1a scenario is 
selected because it represents a future climate where rainfall declines and temperatures increase 
throughout the Zambia, thus potentially jeopardizing agricultural production. We choose the year 2025 
because it is the year closest to the 2006-2015 period analyzed in the previous section.
21 The changes 
observed in our analysis are less pronounced than those found in other studies, since 2025 is considerably 
closer to present day than the more distant projections used elsewhere (e.g., 2050 or 2100). Notably, the 
IPCC report indicates that alternative global scenarios show little variation until 2030, thus making the 
use of multiple scenarios less attractive for the purposes of our analysis. 
Mean monthly changes in climate variables from the HadCM3/B1a scenario are downscaled to 
Zambia’s 30 meteorological stations (see Figure 2), and then applied to the historical monthly weather 
observations for 1976-2007 in order to construct new climate data reflecting climate changes in 2025 as 
per the SRES B1a scenario. The new climate data are then analyzed using the crop water module 
described in Section 2, in order to derive yield effects from climate change. 
Considerable uncertainty surrounds the effects of climate change, especially at the country level. 
Accordingly, two climate change scenarios in addition to the HadCM3/B1a scenario are created to 
examine crop yield responses under larger changes in rainfall and temperature. In the first scenario, we 
assume that temperatures increase by 2°C in every month throughout the country and rainfall declines by 
15 percent from the observed 1975-2007 conditions (this is called the T2P-15 scenario). In the second 
                                                      
19 Recent studies find that carbon fertilization effects may have been overestimated in earlier studies (Long et al., 2006). 
20 The data for Zambia come from the IPCC Data Distribution Center (http://www.ipcc‐data.org/). The B1 storyline and 
scenario family describe a convergent world in which the global population peaks mid-century and declines thereafter; 
experiences rapid changes in economic structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material 
intensity; and sees the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The scenario thus emphasizes global solutions to 
economic, social, and environmental sustainability (including improved equity), but does not anticipate additional climate 
initiatives. 
21 Economic models become substantially more inaccurate beyond 10-15 years, which recommends 2025 as the maximum 
range for our analysis.   
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scenario, we also assume that temperatures increase by 2°C, but rainfall now increases by 15 percent from 
the 1975-2007 series (this is called the T2P+15 scenario). All three of these climate change scenarios 
represent mean changes in future climate at a fixed-year level from the historical climate. These scenarios 
do not account for a gradual evolution of climate change. The reason for this simplification is that we use 
the index sequential method (Prairie et al. 2006) to re-sample the climate series in order to create 
scenarios to be used in the economic model. This implicitly assumes a stationary climate series and does 
not allow for gradual changes.   
Unlike the HadCM3 scenario, the two additional scenarios are not based on global climate model 
projections, but rather are used to represent more dramatic changes for Zambia in the intermediate term. 
They assume uniform changes of temperature and precipitation imposed on the historic temperature and 
precipitation scenarios derived from all 30 sampled Zambian weather stations for the period 1976-2007. 
These kinds of hypothetical scenarios are often used in climate change impact assessment and adaptation 
studies, in order to examine the responses of a study region to a wide range of changes (Zhu et al. 2005; 
Yates et al. 2007). The 2°C increase in temperature and 15 percent decline of rainfall assumed in the T2P-
15 scenario may not necessarily occur by 2025, but the chance that these changes could occur later cannot 
be underestimated, given that many climate models project a drying trend for Southern Africa and the 
current level of global greenhouse emission already exceeds the maximum level projected in the IPCC 
emission scenarios (IPCC 2007a). Likewise, the chance that the warmer and wetter T2P15 scenario could 
happen in the future cannot be excluded, as certain global climate models project a wetting trend for this 
region (IPCC 2007a). Indeed, the uncertainties associated with emission scenarios and climate model 
projections make these hypothetical scenarios useful for examining broader ranges of climate change 
outcomes.  
The climate change scenarios do not explicitly introduce variability changes into the observed 
meteorological data, but rather cause changes in mean climate. We then analyze the impact of these mean 
climate changes on crop yields using the hydro-crop model. Table 10 gives the mean and average 
standard deviation of changes in maize yields relative to the estimated yields for 1976-2007 under each of 
the three climate change scenarios. Under the HadCM3/B1a scenario, yields decline relative to the 
estimated historical trend of 1976-2007 for all agroecological zones, with the exception of Zone IIb, in 
which maize yields increase slightly relative to historical trends. Given that rainfall is generally declining 
under the HadCM3/B1a scenario, this slight yield increase for Zone IIb is the result of complex 
interactions of multiple climate variables that jointly determine crop water requirements and soil moisture 
dynamics. Overall, we conclude that, compared with the past period of 1976-2007, climate change with 
less rainfall and higher temperature (i.e., the HadCM3/B1a scenario) will result in a 1 percent reduction in 
maize yields for Zones I, IIa1 and IIa2 by 2025, but no yield change in Zones IIb and III. As the scenario 
does not capture changes in the patterns of rainfall variation, the standard deviations of maize yields from 
their historical trends have a similar magnitude to the changes in mean. Although the HadCM3/B1a 
scenario results in only small changes in maize mean yield relative to historical trends, the impacts in a 
particular year can be much larger. For example, in a severe drought year similar to that of 1991/92, 
maize yield is 4 percent lower than it is without climate change effect. 
Under the T2P-15 scenario, 4-6 percent declines in maize yields relative to the historical trends 
are observed in all of the agroecological zones with the exception of Zone III, where the reduction is only 
1.4 percent. Again, the magnitude of standard deviations is consistent with the mean change at the zonal 
level. This implies that there will be an average 4-6 percent drop in maize yields throughout most of 
Zambia if rainfall declines by 15 percent and temperatures rise by 2 degrees in the future. Under the 
T2P+15 scenario, the maize mean yield relative to the historical trends increases by 3-4 percent for Zones 
I, IIa1 and IIb. There is a 2 percent increase for Zone IIa2 and a slight increase for Zone III. In both the 
T2P-15 and T2P+15 scenarios, the wetter Zone III is fairly resilient to climate changes in terms of crop 
yield responses to declines or increases in rainfall. In contrast, the four drier zones are likely to face larger 




Table 10. Changes in maize yields relative to historical yield trends under climate-change scenarios 
 HadCM3/B1a  scenario  T2P-15 scenario  T2P+15 scenario 






Zone  I  -0.009 0.013  -0.058 0.069 0.032 0.044 
Zone  IIa1  -0.010 0.014  -0.057 0.058 0.042 0.056 
Zone  IIa2  -0.013 0.013  -0.038 0.041 0.018 0.022 
Zone  IIb  0.001 0.005  -0.045 0.042 0.032 0.045 
Zone  III  -0.002 0.005  -0.014 0.022 0.005 0.015 
Note: HadCM3/B1a is the climate projection of the HadCM3 general circulation model (Hadley Center) using 
IPCC’s SRES B1a green house gas emission scenario; the T2P-15 and T2P+15 scenarios assume that temperatures 
in Zambia rise by 2 percent from temperatures of the 1976-2007 period throughout the country, while rainfall either 
rises or falls by 15 percent. 
Source: Results from the hydro-crop model. 
Climate Change and Economic Growth: DCGE Model Results 
In Section 4 we used the DCGE model to estimate the economic impact of climate variability by 
simulating each of 30 possible climate patterns for a 10-year period drawn sequentially from historical 
data for the period 1976-2007. In this section, we use similar methods to estimate the extent to which 
climate change affects the broad economy through its impact on crop yields (see Table 10). Thus, 
corresponding to each of the three climate change scenarios discussed above, we first adjust the historical 
rainfall data to reflect the new weather conditions predicted in the climate model. These three synthetic 
datasets now contain the effects of both historical climate variability and future climate change. We then 
re-draw the 30 rainfall patterns sequentially from each of the synthetic datasets and compare the average 
outcomes under these new climate change scenarios with the average outcomes discussed in the previous 
section under the climate variability scenarios. The differences between these average outcomes can thus 
be solely attributed to climate change-induced differences in crop yields. The question that these 
modeling exercises try to assess is: What will be the impact of climate variability on crop yields over the 
next 10 years (2007-2016)? The main economywide results from the climate change scenarios are shown 
in Table 11.  
Table 11. Impacts of climate change on economic growth and poverty (deviations from the results 
of the normal rainfall scenario) 
 Change  in  annual 
growth rate (%-point) 
Ten-year cumulative 




















Mean of 32 scenarios, 2007-2016        
No  climate  change  -0.43 -1.01 -4.32  -2.21 2.25  300 
HadCM3/B1a    -0.48 -1.07 -4.69  -2.34 2.49  332 
T2P-15  -0.63 -1.32 -6.02  -2.86 3.25  433 
T2P+15  -0.29 -0.76 -3.00  -1.69 1.55  207 
Worst scenario, 2007-2016        
No  climate  change  -0.90 -2.29 -7.13  -3.13 4.85  648 
HadCM3/B1a    -1.01 -2.55 -7.84  -3.36 5.41  722 
T2P-15  -1.31 -3.35 -9.91  -4.07 7.23  965 
T2P+15  -0.61 -1.51 -5.08  -2.41 3.16  422 




The top half of Table 11 shows deviations in the mean of all rainfall scenarios from the results 
under the normal rainfall scenario. As discussed in Section 4, if climate variability follows its historical 
patterns without accounting for possible climate change, the average decline in the annual growth rate of 
total GDP is 0.4 percentage points. The first row of Table 11 repeats the results from Figure 15 in Section 
4. Incorporating the effects of climate change produces mixed results. The loss in total GDP growth is 
slightly larger under the HadCM3/B1a scenario, but it becomes substantially larger under the T2P-15 
scenario, which captures potential declines in average rainfall due to climate change. Moreover, the 
higher average rainfall under the T2P+15 scenario dampens the adverse effects of climate variability on 
growth, with the result that the average decline in GDP growth is smaller than that seen in the case 
without climate change (Table 11). These results indicate that if climate changes cause less rainfall every 
year, the economic annual growth rate would decline further by between 0.05 percentage points (under 
the HadCM3/B1a scenario) and 0.20 percentage points (under the T2P-15 scenario) in each of the next 10 
years. However, if climate changes cause more rainfall (as under the T2p+15 scenario), the GDP growth 
rate would be slightly higher than that seen without climate change (by 0.14 percentage points). The 
implications of these seemingly small changes in the total GDP growth rate become more substantial once 
their effects are accumulated over the 10-year simulation period (i.e., 2007-2016). For instance, the 
cumulative declines in total GDP under the T2P-15 scenario are US$6 billion (in 2006 prices; US$1.7 
billion more than seen without climate change effects) compared to US$3 billion under the T2P+15 
scenario (US$1.3 billion less than seen without climate change effects). Even under the modest 
HadCM3/B1a scenario, climate change increases the costs already accrued due to climate variability by 
an additional US$0.37 billion over the 10-year period (US$4.69 billion in total in 2006 prices; see Table 
11). Thus, while the economic implications of climate change may appear inconsequential at any given 
point in time, their gradual impact on both total and agricultural GDP becomes more significant over 
time. 
The second part of Table 11 presents deviations in outcomes from the worst rainfall scenario 
reported in Section 4. If Zambia’s rainfall patterns over the next 10 years replicate those observed during 
the 1984/85 to 1994/95 period, then the total growth rate will be 0.9 percentage points lower than it would 
have been under a normal rainfall scenario without variability (see Section 4). However, when we 
incorporate the impact of climate change derived from the HadCM3/B1a scenario, the drop in GDP 
growth rate rises to 1.01 percentage points (i.e., a further 0.1 percentage point decline). Over 10 years, 
this reduced GDP growth rate results in an accumulated GDP loss of US$0.7 billion (in 2006 prices). 
Under the more pessimistic T2P-15 scenario, additional cumulative losses rise dramatically to US$9.9 
billion, which is almost US$3 billion more than that observed when we do not account for climate change 
effects. Conversely, if the more optimistic T2P+15 scenario is accurate, then we see a smaller GDP loss, 
and the accumulated losses fall to US$5.08 billion, which is US$2 billion less than that seen for scenarios 
without climate change effects and those including climate variability alone.  
Finally, the impacts of climate change on national poverty rates and the absolute number of poor 
people by 2016 are reported in the last two columns of Table 11. Since climate change further increases 
the effects of climate variability on agricultural production and food prices, there are significant 
differences in poverty outcomes across the three climate change scenarios. For instance, even with the 
modest HadCM3/B1a scenario, the national poverty rate projected for 2016 is 0.24 percentage points 
higher than that obtained in the absence of climate change (i.e., the poverty rate increases by 2.5 percent 
instead of 2.3 percent by 2016). Thus, climate change increases the absolute number of poor people in 
2016 by 32,000. Similarly, under the worst rainfall scenario together with the HadCM3/B1a scenario, the 
poverty rate is projected to be 0.6 percentage points higher as a result of climate change. These deviations 
in poverty rates are substantially larger for the two hypothetical climate scenarios (i.e., less rainfall 
increases poverty while more rainfall lowers poverty).  
Overall, in Zambia, the additional impact of future climate change on economic growth and 
poverty is substantially smaller than that of climate variability (based on historical patterns). Even under 
more pessimistic climate change scenarios, the effects of climate change are less than half those projected  
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for the climate variability scenarios. However, it should be noted that the climate change scenarios in this 
study do not capture possible changes in climate variability and hence provide only partially illustrative 
results for potential climate change impacts in Zambia. We find that the expected changes remain fairly 
small under the HadCM3/B1a scenario. However, the impacts can be more pronounced if larger changes 
in rainfall and temperature occur (as illustrated by the two hypothetical climate change scenarios) or if 
climate variability patterns change. Moreover, while the average change over the longer term is relatively 
small, considerable impacts may be seen in specific years, especially if there is even less rainfall than that 
experienced during the severe drought years observed in Zambia’s history. Moreover, because we do not 
explicitly capture any possible changes in the patterns of climate variability caused by climate change, 
worsening climate variability exacerbated by climate change may have unexpected subnational impacts 
on the Zambian economy. This possibility emphasizes the importance of investing in climate mitigation 




6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Zambia’s economic performance over the past three decades has been hampered by high levels of climate 
variability and frequent and severe droughts and floods. Even in more recent years, when the country’s 
economy has performed better, there has still been considerable variation in the growth rate of the 
agricultural sector. In order to assess the consequences or impacts of climate variability on economic 
growth and poverty reduction in Zambia, we herein develop an integrated analytical framework. First, we 
use historical climate data and a hydro-crop model to estimate the impact of climate variability on crop 
yields over the past three decades. This analysis is done at the crop level for each of Zambia’s five 
agroecological zones, supported by the identification of zonal-level extreme weather events using a 
drought index analysis. Drawing on these results, we then develop an economywide CGE model and 
analyze the impact of climate variability-induced changes in crop yields on economic growth and poverty. 
In doing this, we consider not only the main impact channel of yield declines, but also other indirect 
impact channels, including effects on crop areas, livestock stocks, and depreciation of physical capital.  
The findings from our economywide modeling assessment suggest that climate variability has a 
pronounced negative effect on economic growth. We estimate that, on average, climate variability reduces 
Zambia’s GDP growth rate by 0.4 percentage points per year, which costs the country US$4.3 billion over 
a 10-year period. These losses reach as high as US$7.1 billion under Zambia’s worst rainfall scenario. 
Agriculture is especially vulnerable and forms the primary impact channel, with climate variability 
reducing agriculture’s annual GDP growth rate by at least 1 percentage point, and by over 2 percentage 
points during the worst rainfall scenario. This will greatly reduce Zambia’s chances of achieving the 
national development goal of strengthening agricultural and rural income growth. Indeed, we find that the 
negative effect of climate variability is especially severe for maize, the country’s main food staple crop, 
and that it therefore greatly threatens basic food security in both rural and urban areas. Most of the 
negative impacts of climate variability occur in the southern and central regions of the country, where 
food insecurity is most vulnerable to climate shocks. Overall, climate variability keeps 300,000 people 
below the national poverty line by 2016. While most of these people live in rural areas, climate variability 
also greatly increases urban poverty due to higher food prices and lower real urban incomes. The number 
of poor rises substantially if rainfall patterns are similar to those experienced in 1985-1995, when the 
country experienced a series of severe droughts. Indeed, the national poverty rate may rise by as much as 
8 percentage points in particularly severe drought years. Climate variability has thus played a significant 
role in undermining economic development in Zambia in the past and will continue to do so in the future. 
We also examine whether climate change will exacerbate or dampen the negative consequences 
of climate variability. Here considerable uncertainty exists, especially regarding changes in future rainfall 
patterns. Accordingly, while we used a well-known climate change projection model, we also analyze two 
hypothetical scenarios. We find that the effects of current patterns of climate variability dominate over 
those of potential climate change in the near future (until 2025). However, differences in assumptions 
regarding rainfall changes influence both the size (to a large degree) and direction (to a lesser extent) of 
the economic impact of climate change. If rainfall declines by 15 percent, then climate change enhances 
the negative effects of climate variability by a factor of 1.5 and pushes an additional 30,000 people below 
the poverty line over a 10-year period. Moreover, the effects of climate change and variability compound 
each other, with the number of poor people rising to 74,000 if climate change is coupled with Zambia’s 
worst 10-year historical rainfall pattern. Thus, climate change may further exacerbate the negative 
consequences of climate variability. There is considerable scope and incentive, therefore, to invest in 
irrigation and water management practices aimed at mitigating the adverse effects of both climate 
variability and climate change on Zambia’s economic development.  
 




Appendix A: Description of the Hydro-Crop (HC) Model 
Quantitative information on crop yield responses to water deficiency is crucial for evaluating the 
economic impacts of climate variability and change on agricultural production. Here, we develop a semi-
empirical model that includes two modules. The first module simulates the soil water balance in the crop 
root zone to derive actual evapotranspiration (ET). The second module estimates crop yield responses to 
water deficits using an empirical crop water production function that takes into account growing stage-
specific crop sensitivity to water stress. Together, these two modules form the integrated ‘hydro-crop’ 
model used in this study.  
The soil water balance module regards the crop root zone as a bucket with water flowing in 
through rainfall (and irrigation if applicable) and leaking away as ET, runoff and deep percolation. The 
first step in determining the soil water balance is to estimate crop water requirements, which are normally 
expressed as a rate of potential ET. The potential ET for a particular crop is estimated using the potential 
ET of a reference crop, usually alfalfa, and a calibrated crop coefficient that converts the reference ET to 
the crop’s potential ET under given climatic conditions. With rainfall and potential ET, the soil water 
balance module calculates the actual ET and water surplus using the actual soil water content and the 
available water capacity (AWC) in the crop root zone. If the soil water content is above a threshold level 
of AWC, then actual ET takes place at the potential rate. It is not, then actual ET is constrained by soil 
moisture. Surface runoff and deep percolation occur if the estimated end-of-period soil water content 
exceeds the AWC. The soil water balance module runs continuously and produces actual ET, which is 
then used in the crop water production function to estimate the crop yield reduction resulting from a water 
deficit. As daily climate data are not available, the soil water balance simulations are done for monthly 
intervals using long-term monthly data. 
The second module in the hydro-crop model is a nonlinear Jensen crop water production model. It 
is used to estimate crop yield responses to water using monthly data for actual and potential ET values 
during the crop-growing season. The Jensen function is an empirical water production function. It has an 
advantage over the FAO crop yield response model in that the Jensen function can account for the crop’s 
growth stage-specific sensitivity to water, whereas the FAO model only considers water deficits for the 
entire growing season and thus cannot capture monthly climate variations and crop yield sensitivities to 
water. We compared observed yields across the five agroecological zones in Zambia with simulations 
from both Jensen and FAO models and found that the Jensen function outperformed the FAO model for 
our purposes. This is in part because crop losses in Zambia are particularly sensitive to seasonal water 
deficits, especially in major drought years. For each crop, the water sensitivity index values in the Jensen 
crop water production function are estimated based on stage-specific FAO yield response factors using 
OLS regression. These are then mapped to each month in the crop’s growing period, using a cumulative 
sensitivity index method.  
For all crops and all agroecological zones in Zambia, hydro-crop model simulations are done 
based on observed meteorological data provided by the Zambia Department of Meteorology. Here, we use 
monthly climate data obtained from 1975 to 2007 at 30 meteorological stations. Rainfall and calculated 
potential ET are aggregated to the five agroecological zones based on the estimated influencing domain of 
each station. The latter are based on the area of each Thiessen polygon within a zone and the areas of 
other Thiessen polygons within the same agroecological zone.  




Table B1.  Specification of the Hydrological and Crop Production Models 
Model Parameter  Unit 
Crop Water 
Requirement 
Kc  Crop coefficient   - 
γ  Psychrometric constant   kPa °C
-1 
KRs  Radiation adjustment coefficient  - 




Field capacity  mm m
-1 
w  Wilting point  mm m
-1 
r Z  
Root zone depth  m 
p  Fraction of active tension water capacity in root zone below 




Ymax  Maximum yield without water stress  t ha
-1 
Ky Yield  response  factor  - 
λt  Crop water sensitivity index  - 
      
Model Variable  Unit 
Crop Water 
Requirement 
ETo Reference  evapotranspiration  mm 
PET  Crop potential evapotranspiration  mm 
Rs  Incoming solar radiation  MJ m
-2 day
-1 
Rn   Net radiation at the crop surface  MJ m
-2 day
-1 
Ra   Extraterrestrial radiation  MJ m
-2 day
-1 
G   Soil heat flux density  MJ m
-2 day
-1 
T  Mean daily air temperature at 2 m height   °C 
Tmax  Maximum daily air temperature at 2 m height  °C 
Tmin  Minimum daily air temperature at 2 m height  °C 
es Saturation  vapor  pressure  kPa 
Δ  Slope vapor pressure curve  kPa °C
-1 
u2  Wind speed at 2 m height  m s
-1 
Soil Water Balance  P  Rainfall mm 
AET
* 
Predicted actual crop evapotranspiration  mm 
AET  Adjusted actual crop evapotranspiration  mm 
S  Soil water content in root zone  mm 
Crop Water 
Production Function 
Ya  Actual crop yield  t ha
-1 
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Table B1.  (Continued) 
Model Equation  Equation No.  Notes 
Crop Water 
Requirement   
 2
2


















2.1 FAO  Penman-
Monteith equation 
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5 . 0
min max  
2.2 Hargreaves’  radiation 
formula as 
recommended by 
Allen et al. (1998) 
when radiation data 
are not available 
 
o c t ET K PET    
2.3 Crop  potential 
evapotranspiration 
(Allen et al. 1998) 
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2.9 Jensen  crop  water 
production function 
(Jensen 1968) 
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Appendix C: Description of the Economywide Model and the Zambian Economy 
A dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model of Zambia is herein developed to examine the 
economywide growth and poverty impacts of the climate variability predicted by the hydrological model. 
In order to better understand how the output of the hydrological model becomes the input of a DCGE 
model and how climate variability directly and indirectly affects the economy, we provide a brief 
description of the DCGE model and its use in the present study. In general, a CGE model is a multi-sector 
general equilibrium model; the model developed for this study also contains detailed information on 
subnational production and employment, as well as national levels of domestic and international trade. 
Households and their income sources are also considered at the subnational level, which allows the model 
to be used for welfare and poverty analysis at the national and subnational levels according to the 
different types of household groups. Below, we discuss the structure of the model in detail with reference 
to the Zambian economy. We then describe how the DCGE model incorporates the output of the 
hydrological model for use in this study. 
Production and Employment  
The DCGE model of Zambia contains 34 production sectors that produce 34 commodities. Among the 34 
sectors, 17 belong to the agricultural sector, nine are industrial and eight are service sectors (see Table C1 
for the list of sectors). Agricultural crops fall into four broad groups: (i) cereals, including maize, 
sorghum, millet, and other cereals (i.e., wheat and rice); (ii) root crops, such as cassava, Irish potatoes, 
and sweet potatoes; (iii) other food crops, including pulses, groundnuts, other oilseeds, vegetables, and 
fruits; and (iv) higher-value export-oriented crops, including cotton, sugar, tobacco, and other export 
crops (e.g., soybeans). The CGE model also identifies three livestock subsectors, namely cattle, poultry, 
and other livestock (e.g., sheep, goats and pigs). The two remaining agricultural subsectors are forestry 
and fisheries. Together, these agricultural subsectors account for 22 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and 16 percent of exports (see Table C2).  
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Table C1: Sectors in the DCGE model 
Agricultural subsectors Irrigated Regional  disaggregation 
     Cereals    
1       Maize  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
2       Sorghum & millet  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
3       Other cereals (i.e., wheat and rice)  Yes  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
4     Root crops (incl. cassava, sweet and Irish potatoes)  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
Other food crops    
5       Pulses & oils (incl. beans)  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
6       Groundnuts  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
7       Vegetables  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
8       Fruits  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
High-value export-oriented crops    
9       Cotton  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
10       Sugarcane  Yes  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
11       Tobacco  No  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
12       Other crops (mainly soybeans)  Yes  5 Zones, urban & large-scale 
Livestock    
13       Cattle    5 Zones & urban 
14       Poultry    5 Zones & urban 
15       Other livestock (incl. goats, sheep and pigs)    5 Zones & urban 
16     Fisheries   5  Zones 
17     Forestry   National 
Industrial subsectors    
18     Mining    National 
19     Food processing, beverages & tobacco    National 
20     Textiles & clothing    National 
21     Wood & paper products    National 
22     Chemicals & rubber products    National 
23     Machinery & equipment (incl. vehicles)    National 
24     Other manufacturing (incl. furniture)    National 
25     Electricity & water     National 
26     Construction    National 
Service subsectors    
27     Trade services    National 
28     Hotels & catering    National 
29     Transport & communication services    National 
30     Financial, business & real estate services    National 
31     Government administration    National 
32     Education services    National 
33     Health services    National 
34     Community & other services    National 
Source: 2006 SAM of Zambia.    
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Table C2: National production and trade structure of the Zambian economy 
  Share of total (%)  Trade intensity 
  GDP  Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Total GDP  100.00 100.00 100.00  19.85  21.67 
Agriculture  21.94 15.75  5.65 15.54  6.63 
   Cereals 9.48  4.06  4.13  9.13  9.78 
Maize 8.78  3.91  2.28  9.42  6.04 
Sorghum & millet  0.43    0.08    5.20 
Other cereals  0.27  0.15  1.77  11.01  60.85 
   Root crops 0.67  0.56  0.11  24.08  6.24 
   Other food crops 4.33  0.02  0.65  0.12  3.93 
Pulses & oils  0.40  0.02  0.14  1.27  8.82 
Groundnuts 1.53         
Vegetables 1.73         
Fruits 0.68    0.50    18.40 
   Export-oriented crops 3.46  9.67  0.33  64.60  6.43 
Cotton 1.14  4.90  0.13  84.61  13.46 
Sugarcane 1.61  2.46    42.03   
Tobacco 0.46  1.20    54.01   
Other crops  0.25  1.12  0.20  100.00  100.00 
   Livestock 2.26  0.17  0.20  1.29  1.78 
Cattle 0.88    0.19    4.94 
Poultry 0.71    0.00    0.07 
Other livestock  0.68  0.17  0.01  5.47  0.38 
   Fisheries 0.93  0.94    21.60   
   Forestry 0.80  0.32  0.23  7.40  6.05 
Mining  7.10 69.06    98.89   
Manufacturing  11.97 5.01  69.25 5.86  49.55 
Food processing  6.46  1.86  3.15  4.57  8.44 
Textiles & clothing  1.75    5.93    36.99 
Wood & paper products  1.14  2.05  1.65  24.13  22.06 
Chemicals & rubber products  1.08  1.11  23.51  8.79  69.01 
Machinery & equipment  1.26    33.04    79.78 
Other manufacturing  0.28    1.97    55.29 
Electricity & water   2.95        
Construction  5.73        
Services  50.31 10.18 25.09  5.09 12.29 
   Trade services  17.36         
   Hotels & catering  2.94  5.98    47.86   
   Transport & communication   4.78  4.20  21.52  19.59  56.97 
   Financial and business services  4.65    3.57    17.55 
   Government administration  8.07         
   Education services  8.90         
   Health services  2.97         
   Community & other services  0.63         
Note: Export intensity is the share of exports in domestic output, and import intensity is the share of imports in 
domestic supply.  
Source: 2006 SAM of Zambia.  
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Zambia’s industrial sectors account for 28 percent of GDP, meaning that together they are similar 
in size to the agricultural sector. However, most of the manufacturing sectors (e.g., food processing, 
textiles and wood products) are linked to agriculture; most agricultural commodities are not only exported 
or consumed by households in Zambia, but are also used as inputs for upstream processing activities, 
which together generate an additional 9 percent of GDP. However, while agriculture and related sectors 
dominate GDP, copper is the most important export, generating 70 percent of total export earnings. 
Almost all mining production is exported, reflecting the relatively weak linkages between this sector and 
the rest of the economy. The DCGE model captures Zambia’s sectoral structure and its intersectoral 
linkages by drawing on the information contained in the 2006 social accounting matrix (SAM).
22  
Beyond its sectoral detail, the DCGE model also captures subnational or spatial heterogeneity in 
production patterns. Based on district-level data from the 2004/05 Crop Forecasting Survey (CFS04/05), 
agricultural production is disaggregated across the five agro-climatic regions in a manner similar to that 
seen in the hydrological model [i.e., Zambia’s four agroecological zones, with Zone IIa further divided 
into western (Zone IIa1) and eastern (Zone IIa2) sub-zones]. Moreover, we capture the unique 
circumstances of urban agriculture by separately identifying agricultural production for the main urban 
centers based on household production information drawn from the 2004/05 Living Standards Monitoring 
Survey (LCMS4).
23 Thus, six subnational regions are identified in the model: five rural and one urban. 
Finally, a seventh group comprising large-scale farmers is separated from the small/medium-scale 
producers that tend to be zone-specific. The different cropping patterns of these farm groups are shown in 
Table C3. 
Forty-two percent of harvested land is allocated to maize production, making maize the main crop 
in Zambia. Scale of production is therefore a key distinguishing feature among farmers. While large-scale 
farmers represent only 8 percent of total maize land, they produce 22 percent of maize in the country.
24 
There is virtually no irrigated maize production in Zambia. Average yields for large-scale farmers are 
high for dry-land production at over 6 tons per hectare in 2005, a year with relatively good rainfall. In 
contrast, small-scale farmers, who account for four-fifths of maize production, achieve much lower yields 
of around 2 tons per hectare. The agroecological conditions across zones are also important factors in 
determining the yield level. Smallholder maize yields range from around 1.5 tons per hectare in the 
southern and western regions (Zones I and IIb) to 2.4 tons per hectare in the central region (Zone IIa1). 
Other factors also serve to concentrate maize production within specific regions. For instance, four-fifths 
of large-scale maize production takes place in Zone IIa1, where the agroecological conditions are more 
favorable in a normal rainfall year and farmers have better access to urban centers. Finally, urban-based 
farmers are also an important part of Zambia’s agricultural system. Around a quarter of urban households 
engage in agricultural production, primarily maize cropping and livestock. Thus, in summary, while Zone 
III is the largest region in terms of cultivated land size, the central Zone IIa1 dominates maize production 
in Zambia due to higher maize yields and a concentration of large-scale and urban farmers in this region.  
The remaining cereal groups differ sharply in their production structures and technologies. On 
one hand, sorghum and millet is overwhelmingly a smallholder crop and is particularly important as a 
drought-tolerant staple in Zambia’s drier southern region (Zone I). On the other hand, wheat (which is 
aggregated into the ‘other cereals’ subsector in the model) is grown entirely under irrigation, by large-
scale farmers in the southern and central regions of the country (Zones I and IIa1). Some smallholders 
grow rice (also included in ‘other cereals’), especially in the northern region, but relatively little land is 
allocated to this crop. As such, the ‘other cereals’ group is treated as being entirely irrigated. Finally, as 
with maize, the regional concentration of wheat production reflects differences in agroecological 
conditions and market access, and further justifies the division of Zone IIa into eastern and western sub-
zones in our study.  
                                                      
22 The 2006 Zambia SAM is an updated and aggregated version of the 2004 SAM used in Thurlow et al. (2008).  
23 Metropolitan centers are defined as urban areas in the districts of Kabwe (Central); Chingola, Chililabombwe, Kitwe, 
Kalulushi, Lufwanyama, Mufulira and Ndola (Copperbelt); Lusaka (Lusaka); and Livingstone (Southern). 
24 Large-scale farmers in Zambia are defined as those having more than 20 hectares of land.  
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Table C3: National production and trade structure of the Zambian economy 
  Share of total (%)  Trade intensity 
  GDP  Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Total GDP  100.00 100.00 100.00  19.85  21.67 
Agriculture  21.94  15.75 5.65  15.54 6.63 
   Cereals  9.48 4.06 4.13 9.13 9.78 
Maize  8.78 3.91 2.28 9.42 6.04 
Sorghum & millet  0.43    0.08    5.20 
Other cereals  0.27  0.15  1.77  11.01  60.85 
   Root crops  0.67 0.56 0.11  24.08 6.24 
   Other food crops  4.33 0.02 0.65 0.12 3.93 
Pulses  &  oils  0.40 0.02 0.14 1.27 8.82 
Groundnuts  1.53      
Vegetables  1.73      
Fruits 0.68    0.50    18.40 
   Export-oriented crops  3.46 9.67 0.33  64.60 6.43 
Cotton 1.14  4.90  0.13  84.61  13.46 
Sugarcane  1.61  2.46   42.03  
Tobacco  0.46  1.20   54.01  
Other crops  0.25  1.12  0.20  100.00  100.00 
   Livestock  2.26 0.17 0.20 1.29 1.78 
Cattle  0.88   0.19   4.94 
Poultry  0.71   0.00   0.07 
Other  livestock  0.68 0.17 0.01 5.47 0.38 
   Fisheries  0.93  0.94   21.60  
   Forestry  0.80 0.32 0.23 7.40 6.05 
Mining  7.10  69.06   98.89  
Manufacturing  11.97 5.01  69.25 5.86  49.55 
   Food processing  6.46  1.86  3.15  4.57  8.44 
   Textiles & clothing  1.75    5.93    36.99 
   Wood & paper products  1.14  2.05  1.65  24.13  22.06 
   Chemicals & rubber products  1.08  1.11  23.51  8.79  69.01 
   Machinery & equipment  1.26    33.04    79.78 
   Other manufacturing  0.28    1.97    55.29 
Electricity & water   2.95      
Construction  5.73      
Services  50.31 10.18 25.09  5.09 12.29 
   Trade services  17.36         
   Hotels & catering  2.94  5.98    47.86   
   Transport & communication   4.78  4.20  21.52  19.59  56.97 
   Financial and business services  4.65    3.57    17.55 
   Government administration  8.07         
   Education services  8.90         
   Health services  2.97         
   Community & other services  0.63         
Note: Export intensity is the share of exports in domestic output, and import intensity is the share of imports in 
domestic supply. 
Source: 2006 SAM of Zambia.   
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The remaining food crops are distributed across the country roughly in proportion to each zone’s 
total land area. The only exception is root crops. Although cassava and potatoes are grown in all zones, 
they are particularly important in the eastern and northern regions (Zones IIa2 and III), where a larger 
amount of land is allocated to root crops than to maize. Finally, Zambia’s export crops are also 
concentrated in some specific zones. Cotton is grown in the eastern and central regions (Zone IIa) under 
smallholder out-grower schemes, while tobacco is almost exclusively grown in the eastern region (Zone 
IIa2) by both small- and large-scale farmers. Both of these crops are grown on dry lands. In contrast, 
sugarcane and soybeans (included in ‘other crops’ subsector in the model) are grown under irrigation by 
large-scale farmers in the center of the country (i.e., Zone IIa2). Finally, livestock is an important 
agricultural subsector, generating 10 percent of agricultural GDP. Three quarters of livestock GDP is 
found in Zones I and IIa1, where cattle herds and poultry stocks are largest and form an important source 
of rural incomes. 
The DCGE model captures differences in production technologies, such as the higher labor-
intensity of agriculture and the capital-intensity of industry. Here the model identifies eight factors of 
production: three types of labor (unskilled workers, skilled workers, and family farm labor); three kinds 
of capital (agricultural, mining and nonagricultural); and two kinds of agricultural assets (land and 
livestock stocks). Skilled and unskilled workers are assumed to be fully employed and are able to migrate 
across regions and sectors in response to changes in labor demand. However, family farm labor and 
agricultural capital can only be allocated across farm activities within each zone. Since we are interested 
in capturing the impact of rainfall variation shocks, we assume that the allocation of land, livestock 
stocks, and nonagricultural capital across different production activities is constant, so these factors are 
immobile across sectors and earn sector-specific returns. Producers in each zone and sector employ the 
eight different factors at varying intensities in order to maximize profits under constant returns to scale, 
with the choice between factors governed by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. 
Composite factors are then combined with intermediate inputs under a Leontief specification with fixed 
input-output coefficients taken from the input-output table underlying the 2005 Zambian SAM.  
Domestic and International Trade 
Table C2 shows the structure of foreign trade in Zambia, and clearly reveals that the country is heavily 
dependent on mining exports. However, there was considerable growth in agricultural exports during the 
1990s, especially in cotton and sugarcane. Zambia is both an importer and exporter of maize, with the net 
trade position varying from year to year and depending on the rainfall situation. Most large-scale wheat 
production in the country is for the domestic market, and some wheat imports are needed, although at 
relatively low levels. Imports are actually dominated by nonagricultural products. Chemicals (including 
fuels) and machinery (including vehicles and equipment) are highly import-intensive subsectors. Thus, 
despite being landlocked, Zambia is heavily reliant on international trade, which in turn is concentrated 
within a narrow range of commodities for both exports and imports.  
The DCGE model captures these linkages with the rest of the world through exports and imports. 
Producers in each region supply their output to a national commodity market, where they are exported, 
sold domestically, and/or combined with imported goods. Substitution possibilities exist between 
production for domestic and foreign markets based on a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) 
function. Profit maximization drives producers to sell in those markets where they can achieve the highest 
returns. These returns are based on domestic and export prices (where the latter is determined by the 
world price times the exchange rate). Substitution possibilities also exist between imported and domestic 
goods under a CES Armington specification. The ratio of imports to domestic goods is determined by the 
cost-minimizing decision-making of domestic demanders based on the relative prices of imports and 
domestic goods (both of which include the relevant taxes). 
Under the small-country assumption, Zambia faces perfectly elastic foreign demand/supply from 
the world at fixed world prices. However, with imperfect substitution between domestically produced and 
consumed goods and export or import goods, prices for all commodities either produced or sold in  
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domestic markets are endogenous. While an integrated domestic market is assumed, agricultural products 
produced from different zones are imperfectly substitutable.  
Household Incomes and Poverty 
The DCGE model distinguishes among various representative household groups. While representative 
households are zone-specific, they are further disaggregated into rural and urban areas. Rural households 
within each zone are further distinguished into three groups: small farm, large-scale farm, and non-farm 
households. Urban and metropolitan households are disaggregated into two groups depending on whether 
or not they engage in agricultural production. Each of the 27 representative households in the DCGE 
model is an aggregation of individual households captured in the 2004/05 household survey (LCMS4). 
Households in the model receive income from different factors employed in different production 
processes. They then pay taxes to and/or receive transfers from the government. A part of household 
incomes come from abroad as remittance receipts. As the dynamics of the model are recursive, fixed 
saving rates are assumed for each representative household. The income allocated to consumption of 
different commodities is derived from maximizing a Stone-Geary utility function, which results in a linear 
expenditure system (LES) of demand.
25  
Table C4 provides income and poverty statistics for the representative aggregate household 
groups used in the model. Poverty is extremely high in Zambia, with 67.9 percent of the population of 11 
million falling below the official poverty line of around US$300 per person per year. Poverty is highest in 
rural areas, where 61 percent of the population resides. As a result, more than 70 percent of Zambia’s 
poor population lives in rural areas where, on average, they derive about 80 percent of their incomes from 
agriculture. 
Poverty rates are high in all five of the rural zones identified in the DCGE model. However, there 
is some variation, with poverty lowest in Zone IIa2 and highest in Zone IIb. The former includes many 
cotton farmers, whose rising incomes were instrumental in reducing rural poverty in Zambia during the 
mid-1990s. However, while per capita incomes are highest in Zone IIa1, poverty rates in this zone are still 
high at 79 percent. This reflects Zambia’s high income inequality, with the relatively few households 
located closest to large urban centers and major transport routes having a considerably lower incidence of 
poverty.
26 Finally, Table C4 shows average farm plot sizes for the different household groups, which vary 
greatly across zones. Farm plots are smallest in urban areas and in Zone IIb and largest in the more 
sparsely populated Zone IIa2. The DCGE model captures these differences in household income patterns, 
as well as differences in income spending.   
To assess the impact of the alternative rainfall scenarios on household poverty, the DCGE model needs to 
link with a micro-simulation model that includes each sample household in the 2004/05 LCMS. These 
sample households are further linked to their corresponding representative household in the DCGE model 
on the consumption side. In this formulation, changes in representative households’ consumptions of 
individual commodities (resulting from income and commodity price changes) in the DCGE model are 
passed down to their corresponding households in the micro-simulation model, where total consumption 
expenditures are recalculated in real terms. This new level of per capita expenditure for each survey 
household is compared to the official poverty line, and standard poverty measures are recalculated.  
Model Closure and Dynamics 
The DCGE model captures the workings of the government, which receives revenues from imposing 
activity, sales and direct taxes and import tariffs, and then makes transfers to households and the rest of 
the world. The government also purchases commodities in the form of government consumption or 
recurrent expenditures, and the remaining income of government is (dis)saved. All savings from 
                                                      
25 The LES specification identifies a portion of consumption for subsistence (it is income and price independent). The 
remaining consumption quantities are sensitive to price and income changes. Commodity income elasticities are taken from 
Thurlow et al. (forthcoming) and allow for differences between marginal and average budget shares.  
26 See Thurlow and Wobst (2006) on the role of remoteness in determining rural poverty in Zambia.  
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households, government and capital inflows from abroad (foreign savings) form a savings pool from 
which investment is financed.  
The model contains three macroeconomic accounts: (i) the government account; (ii) the savings-
investment account; and (iii) the current account. To balance among the macroeconomic accounts, it is 
necessary to specify a set of ‘macroclosure’ rules that provide a mechanism through which 
macroeconomic balance can be achieved. Following Solow’s growth theory, a savings-driven closure is 
assumed in order to balance the savings-investment account. Under this closure, households’ savings rates 
are held fixed, and investment adjusts endogenously to equalize investment and savings in equilibrium. In 
the government account, the direct tax rates on households and capital are assumed to remain unchanged, 
with government revenues and expenditures balancing through changes in public spending and the fiscal 
deficit. Finally, for the current account we assume that foreign savings (i.e., foreign capital inflows) are 
constant. The exchange rate is chosen as the model’s numéraire.  
Our DCGE model is a ‘recursive’ dynamic model, which means that there is no intertemporal 
decision-making for households, either as consumers or as producers. Thus, the stock variables must be 
updated between periods. While growth in the population (and hence in the labor supply and agricultural 
land expansion) is exogenously determined between periods, the capital accumulation is endogenously 
constrained by the level of investment in previous time periods. Once the new capital is formed from the 
previous periods’ investments, it becomes part of the capital stock that is allocated to different sectors 
according to the sectoral level of capital returns. This implies that sectors with above-average returns in 















Average size and allocation of crop land (ha) 
  Total  Poor  Total  Size  Kw 1000  $US  All crops Maize  Roots  Other foods Export crops
All  households  10,986 7,461 2,089 5.26  1,861  417 67.9  -  -  -  -  - 
Urban  households 4,298  2,271 814  5.28  3,242 726  52.8  -  -  -  -  - 
   Non-farm  3,075  1,484  619  4.97  3,625  812  48.3  -  -  -  -   
   Farm  1,223  793  195  6.26  2,281  511  64.8  0.25  0.17  0.00  0.08  0.00 
Rural  households  6,687 5,192 1,275 5.24  974  218 77.6  -  -  -  -  - 
      Non-farm  722 540 171  4.22  1,320 296  74.8  -  -  -  -  - 
   Farm  5,965  4,653  1,104  5.40  932  209  78.0  -  -  -  -  - 
     Zone I  814  657  144  5.64  754  169  80.8  1.18  0.63  0.08  0.36  0.11 
     Zone IIa1  1,258  991  215  5.86  1,564  350  78.8  1.26  0.64  0.09  0.24  0.30 
     Zone IIa2  1,074  790  198  5.42  859  192  73.6  1.52  0.68  0.07  0.36  0.41 
     Zone IIb  383  321  75  5.08  648  145  84.0  0.69  0.18  0.33  0.15  0.02 
     Zone III  2,437  1,892  471  5.17  793  178  77.6  1.11  0.34  0.41  0.34  0.01 




Table D1.  Specification of the Computable General Equilibrium Model 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol Explanation 
Sets      
  Activities  Commodities not in CM 
 
Activities with a Leontief 





  Commodities   
Commodities with 
domestic production  
 
Commodities with domestic 
sales of domestic output    Factors 
  Commodities not in CD   
Institutions (domestic and 
rest of world) 
  Exported commodities   Domestic institutions 






  Households 
Parameters      
 
Weight of commodity c in the 
CPI    Quantity of stock change 
 
Weight of commodity c in the 
producer price index 
Base-year quantity of 
government demand 
 
Quantity of c as intermediate 
input per unit of activity a   




Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per unit of c’ 
produced and sold domestically   
Share for domestic 
institution i in income of 
factor f 
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per exported unit    
Share of net income of i’ 
to i  
 
Quantity of commodity c as 
trade input per imported unit of 
c’  
  Tax rate for activity a 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
 
Exogenous direct tax rate 
for domestic institution i 
 
Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per activity 
unit 
 
Parameter (0-1); = 1 for 
institutions with 
potentially flexed direct 
tax rates 
 
Base savings rate for domestic 
institution i    Import tariff rate 
 
Parameter (0-1); = 1 for 
institutions with potentially 
flexed direct tax rates 
   Rate of sales tax 
  Export price (foreign currency)  Transfer from factor f to 
institution i 
  Import price (foreign currency)     
aA  () cC M N C  
() aA L E O A  () cC T C  
cC  () cC X C  
() cC D C  f F 
() cC D N C  iI N S 
() cC E C  () i INSD INS  
() cC E N C  () i INSDNG INSD  
() cC M C  () hH I N S D N G  





' cc icd if shif
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Table D1. (Continued) 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Greek Symbols     
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES 
activity function    CET function share parameter 
 
Efficiency parameter in the CES value-
added function 
CES value-added function share 
parameter for factor f in activity a 
 
Shift parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function 
Subsistence consumption of marketed 
commodity c for household h 
 
Armington function shift parameter  Yield of output c per unit of activity a 
  CET function shift parameter     CES production function exponent 
  Capital sectoral mobility factor  CES value-added function exponent 
 
Marginal share of consumption 
spending on marketed commodity c for 
household h   
Domestic commodity aggregation 
function exponent 
  CES activity function share parameter  Armington function exponent 
 
Share parameter for domestic 
commodity aggregation function  CET function exponent 
  Armington function share parameter  Sector share of new capital 
 
Capital depreciation rate     
Exogenous Variables    
  Consumer price index    
Savings rate scaling factor (= 0 for 
base) 
 
Change in domestic institution tax 
share (= 0 for base; exogenous 
variable)   
Quantity supplied of factor 
   Foreign savings (FCU)   
Direct tax scaling factor (= 0 for base; 
exogenous variable) 
 
Government consumption adjustment 
factor 
Wage distortion factor for factor f in 
activity a 
  Investment adjustment factor     
Endogenous Variables    
 
Average capital rental rate in time 
period t   
Government consumption demand for 
commodity 
 
Change in domestic institution savings 
rates (= 0 for base; exogenous variable)   
Quantity consumed of commodity c by 
household h 
 
Producer price index for domestically 
marketed output   
Quantity of household home 
consumption  
  Government expenditures   
Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
input 
  Consumption spending for household   
Quantity of commodity c as 
intermediate input to activity a 
  Exchange rate (LCU per unit of FCU)  Quantity of investment demand  
  Government savings  Quantity of imports of commodity c 

























































Table D1. (Continued) 
Symbol Explanation  Symbol  Explanation 
Endogenous Variables Continued     
 
Marginal propensity to save for 
domestic non-government 
institution (exogenous variable) 
 
Quantity of goods supplied to 
domestic market (composite 
supply) 
 
Activity price (unit gross 
revenue)    
Quantity of commodity 
demanded as trade input 
 
Demand price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically   
Quantity of (aggregate) value-
added 
 
Supply price for commodity 
produced and sold domestically   
Aggregated quantity of 
domestic output of commodity 
 
Export price (domestic 
currency)    
Quantity of output of 
commodity c from activity a 
 
Aggregate intermediate input 
price for activity a    Real average factor price 
 
Unit price of capital in time 
period t     Total nominal absorption 
 
Import price (domestic 
currency)   
Direct tax rate for institution i 
(i  INSDNG) 
  Composite commodity price   
Transfers from institution i’ to 
i (both in the set INSDNG) 
 
Value-added price (factor 
income per unit of activity)  Average price of factor 
 
Aggregate producer price for 
commodity  Income of factor f 
 
Producer price of commodity c 
for activity a    Government revenue 
  Quantity (level) of activity   
Income of domestic non-
government institution 
 
Quantity sold domestically of 
domestic output 
Income to domestic institution 
i from factor f 
  Quantity of exports  Quantity of new capital by 
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Table D1 (Continued) 
 
Production and Price Equations   
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Table D1. (Continued) 
Institutional Incomes and Domestic Demand Equations   
(36) 
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